关键词: 碳配额, 政府补贴, 再制造, 博弈论

Abstract:

According to the United Nations Environment Programme （UNEP）， greenhouse gas emissions have increased by 1.5% per year over the past 10 years， including a record high of 55.3 billion tons of “carbon dioxide equivalent” in 2018.To effectively achieve the goal of reducing total carbon emissions， the EU introduced a carbon cap-and-trade system.To achieve the carbon peak action， not only need efficient emission reduction policy guidance， but also need to actively undertake social responsibility to respond to the government's call to achieve corporate value.In order to reduce carbon emissions while ensuring their own interests， some construction machinery companies began to implement remanufacturing strategies to reduce operating costs.Therefore， under the goal of carbon emission reduction， remanufacturing is considered an effective way to reuse waste resources in manufacturing industry and low-carbon transformation of production methods， as well as an important element to promote the orderly construction of the national carbon emission trading market.Consequently， in the context of the national promotion of carbon peaking， in the carbon trading policy to restrict the production activities of original manufacturers， whether the dual policy of government subsidies to remanufacturers to promote the development of remanufacturing industry can still promote the development of the overall closed-loop supply chain， and how the government should reasonably arrange the subsidy policy and different carbon quota allocation methods to facilitate the development of remanufacturing industry while increasing social benefits is an issue worth exploring.Based on the diversification of current carbon allowance allocation modes and the government's implementation of circular economy， in order to analyze the influence， which is under different allocation modes of carbon allowance， of government subsidies on an original manufacturer （OEM） and a remanufacturer in the closed-loop supply chain， it comparatively constructs a game model of an original manufacturer and a remanufacturer based on the grandfathering mechanism and the benchmarking mechanism when the government conducts static single cycle subsidies to remanufacturers. The results are as follow： （1） Under the benchmarking mechanism， government subsidies can be conducive to further expanding market capacity and promoting the development of low-carbon market， but it is difficult for original manufacturers to play their initiative； When the government subsidy is greater than a certain threshold under the grandfathering mechanism， the government behavior can have a positive effect on all parties in the supply chain； （2） When the government subsidy budget is fixed， the grandfathering mechanism is more conducive to the profit of the original manufacturer， and the benchmarking mechanism is more conducive to improving the profit of the remanufacturer； （3） When the government aims to increase social and economic benefits， the combination of grandfathering law and subsidies is better. However， when the government aims to improve social welfare or social benefits， the benchmarking method is better； （4） Government subsidies are conducive to promoting the development of the remanufacturing industry. Based on different subsidy purposes and different development stages of the industry， selecting appropriate carbon quota methods is conducive to better playing the role of government subsidies.

Key words: carbon allowance allocation, government subsidy, remanufacturing, game model