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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (7): 324-334.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1728cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1728

• • 上一篇    

基于演化博弈的建筑垃圾处理协同机制及仿真

邵志国1,2(),李梦笛1,韩传峰2,3,孟令鹏4,吴启迪5   

  1. 1.青岛理工大学管理工程学院, 山东 青岛 266525
    2.同济大学经济与管理学院, 上海 200092
    3.山东建筑大学管理工程学院, 山东 济南 250101
    4.上海海事大学中国(上海)自贸区供应链研究院, 上海 201306
    5.同济大学电子与信息工程学院, 上海 200092
  • 收稿日期:2021-08-28 修回日期:2021-11-20 出版日期:2024-07-25 发布日期:2024-08-07
  • 通讯作者: 邵志国 E-mail:shaozhiguo@qut.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(71874123);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(17YJC630184)

Simulation and Cooperative Mechanism of Construction Waste Disposal Based on Evolutionary Game

Zhiguo Shao1,2(),Mengdi Li1,Chuanfeng Han2,3,Lingpeng Meng4,Qidi Wu5   

  1. 1.School of Management Engineering, Qingdao University of Technology, Qingdao 266525, China
    2.School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China
    3.School of Management Engineering, Shandong Jianzhu University, Jinan 250101, China
    4.China Institute of FTZ Supply Chain, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China
    5.School of Electronics and Information Engineering, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China
  • Received:2021-08-28 Revised:2021-11-20 Online:2024-07-25 Published:2024-08-07
  • Contact: Zhiguo Shao E-mail:shaozhiguo@qut.edu.cn

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摘要：

随着城市化进程的不断推进，大规模建筑活动产生巨量建筑垃圾，加重了资源浪费、环境污染及市容破坏等问题。建筑垃圾的有效处理可减轻环境污染及资源短缺，促进建筑业的可持续发展。建筑垃圾处理中参与主体之间的利益均衡是实现垃圾有效处理的关键所在。因此，本文在有限理性假设条件下，从利益视角出发，以提高建筑垃圾处理效率为目标，厘清施工企业、政府和公众在建筑垃圾处理中的角色和复杂利益关系。基于演化博弈理论，建立演化博弈收益矩阵与演化博弈树，构建各利益主体的复制动态方程，分析系统的演化稳定策略，利用Matlab仿真演化路径，并结合系统动力学对系统初始策略与外部变量进行仿真分析。研究结果表明，当施工企业、政府和公众积极处理的收益大于消极处理的收益或成本时，各主体趋向于积极处理；施工企业是建筑垃圾的生产者，因而政府和公众应加强协作，积极监管引导其合法处理建筑垃圾；施工企业受罚、政府补贴及公众积极参与等行为可有效促进建筑垃圾的合法处理。研究成果可为提高建筑垃圾处理效率、促进建筑企业的可持续发展提供理论参考。

关键词: 建筑垃圾处理, 协同机制, 演化博弈, 系统动力学, 数值仿真

Abstract:

With the continuous advancement of urbanization， huge amounts of construction waste is generated in the large-scale construction activities， which has aggravated the problems of resources waste， environmental pollution and city appearance destruction. The effective disposal of construction waste can reduce environmental pollution and resource shortage， and promote the sustainable development of the construction industry. The balance of interests among the participants in the disposal of construction waste is a key factor for effective disposal. Therefore， under the assumption of bounded rationality， it aims to improve the efficiency of construction waste disposal from the perspective of interests， and clarify the roles and complex interest relationships of construction enterprises， the government and the public in construction waste disposal. Based on the evolutionary game theory， the evolutionary game revenue matrix and evolutionary game tree are established， the replication dynamic equation of each stakeholder is constructed， and the evolutionary stability strategy of the system is analyzed. The evolution path is simulated by Matlab， and the initial strategy and external variables of the system are simulated and analyzed combined with the system dynamics. The results show that when the benefits of active disposal by construction companies， the government， and the public are greater than the benefits or costs of passive disposal， each entity tends to actively disposal； construction companies are the generators of construction waste， so the government and the public should strengthen cooperation and actively supervise and guide them to legally dispose construction waste； penalties for construction companies， government subsidies， and active public participation can effectively promote the legal disposal of construction waste. The results can provide a theoretical reference for improving the efficiency of construction waste disposal and promoting the sustainable development of construction enterprises in China.

Key words: construction waste disposal, cooperative mechanism, evolutionary game, system dynamics, numerical simulation

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