双重依赖下分包商利他偏好真的有利于公共产品技术创新吗？

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0256

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 新型举国体制下委托企业联合攻关是公共产品技术创新的重要途径，传统的研究往往忽视分包商的特征以及它们之间的关系，导致研究结论与现实存在偏差。故本文在考虑外部事件共同冲击引起的随机依赖的基础上，将分包商之间的合作与帮助所表征的技术依赖也考虑在内，并结合分包商的贡献大小，构建了双重依赖下考虑利他偏好的双代理人模型，探究分包商利他偏好对公共部门最优合同类型与期望收益的影响。结果发现：首先，双重依赖时利他偏好对最优合同的影响，双重依赖中随机依赖决定纯自利偏好情形下间接激励系数的正负，且分包商利他偏好强度与随机依赖强度越强，公共部门越应该选择相对绩效合同；其次，双重依赖时利他偏好对期望收益的影响，双方利他偏好强度相等时公共部门期望收益不受利他偏好的影响；低贡献者的利他偏好强度越强，对公共部门期望收益的提升越有利，反之则不然；当双方贡献大小相等时，公共部门期望收益随着双方利他偏好强度差异的扩大而提升。总之，公共部门并不总是从双方利他偏好中获益。

关键词: 公共产品技术创新；联合研发；利他偏好；技术依赖；合同类型；随机依赖

Abstract: Entrusted enterprises joint research is an important way to obtain technological innovation of public goods under the new type of national system with concentrated efforts and resources for important events or projects. While most traditional studies didn’t consider subcontractors’ characteristics and the relationships among them, resulting in inconsistency between conclusions and reality. Therefore, a two-agent model considering altruistic preferences under the technological and stochastic dependencies in conjunction with the size of subcontractors’ contributions, is constructed to explore the impact of subcontractors’ altruistic preferences on the optimal contract type and expected returns in the public sector.

Key words: public goods technological innovation; joint research and development; altruism; technological dependence; contract type; stochastic dependence

中图分类号:

G304

武柏宇, 仲伟俊, 梅姝娥. 双重依赖下分包商利他偏好真的有利于公共产品技术创新吗？[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(2): 182-194.

WU Bai-yu, ZHONG Wei-jun, MEI Shu-e. Is the Subcontractors’ Altruism really Beneficial to Public Goods Technological Innovation under Dual Dependence?[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(2): 182-194.

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