基于生产者责任延伸的新能源汽车动力电池回收帕累托均衡

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0956

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 动力电池回收过程涉及到产业链上多个利益主体，存在回收责任界定不清、企业回收积极性不高、回收成本居高不下等问题。考虑在生产者责任延伸理念下，整车企业承担回收的主体责任，构建整车企业、动力电池生产企业和第三方回收拆解企业的三方博弈模型，通过模型求解，分析帕累托均衡状态。研究结果表明：不同市场环境因素对各企业策略选择的影响强弱不尽相同，而作为回收责任的源头主体，整车企业策略选择极大程度上决定了电池生产企业承担延伸责任的积极性，对构建良性回收网络有关键性影响；同时不同主体间的研发补贴作用有所不同，持续增加补贴会起到一定的反作用。

关键词: 生产者责任延伸；新能源汽车；电池回收；合作博弈；帕累托均衡

Abstract: The growth of demand for power batteries will be inevitably driven by the rapid development of the new energy vehicle, and the derivative problem of battery recycling is becoming more and more prominent. However, multiple stakeholders are involved in the recycling process of power battery, and there are many problemssuch as unclear definition of recycling responsibilities, low enthusiasm of enterprises and high recycling costs. Therefore, the improvement of market system from the source prevention to the end-treatment will be a long-term process, requiring the joint efforts of multiple entities. Considering the concept of extended producer responsibility and the subject responsibility of recycling taking by the vehicle enterprise, a tripartite game model, which is based on the interests of vehicle enterprises, battery manufacturers and third-party dismantling corporations, is built in this paper. The benefit relationship of each party during green production and recycling of the waste battery is analyzed in this model. Matlab software is used to simulate the process of three-party interaction.

Key words: extended producer responsibility; new energy vehicles; battery recycling; cooperative game; pareto equilibrium

中图分类号:

F423.3

谢隽阳, 乐为, 郭本海. 基于生产者责任延伸的新能源汽车动力电池回收帕累托均衡[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(11): 309-320.

XIE Jun-yang, LE Wei, GUO Ben-hai. Pareto Equilibrium of New Energy Vehicle Power Battery Recycling Based on Extended Producer Responsibility[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(11): 309-320.

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