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中国管理科学 ›› 2017, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (7): 113-122.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.07.013

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

集中采购参与意愿、制药企业议价能力与药品市场绩效

张新鑫1, 侯文华2, 申成霖3, 何强4   

  1. 1. 天津理工大学管理学院, 天津 300384;
    2. 南开大学商学院, 天津 300071;
    3. 天津工业大学管理学院, 天津 300387;
    4. 天津中医药大学管理学院, 天津 300073
  • 收稿日期:2015-06-29 修回日期:2016-10-25 出版日期:2017-07-20 发布日期:2017-09-25
  • 通讯作者: 申成霖(1975-),男(汉族),山东莒县人,天津工业大学管理学院,教授,硕士生导师,研究方向:创新及运营管理,E-mail:shenchnenglin@tjpu.edu.cn. E-mail:shenchnenglin@tjpu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:

    国家社会科学基金项目(15BGL074);天津市哲学社科规划项目(TJGL15-035);天津市教委人文社科重大项目(2011ZD032);天津市宣传文化"五个一批"人才培养工程(2015CR05)

Willingness to Participate in Group Procurement, Pharmaceutical Enterprises' Bargaining Power and Performance of Medicine Market

ZHANG Xin-xin1, HOU Wen-hua2, Shen Cheng-lin3, HE Qiang4   

  1. 1. School of Management, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China;
    2. School of Business, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China;
    3. School of Management, Tianjin Polytechnic University, Tianjin 300387, China;
    4. School of Management, Tianjin University of Traditional Chinese Medicine, Tianjin 300073, China
  • Received:2015-06-29 Revised:2016-10-25 Online:2017-07-20 Published:2017-09-25

摘要: 以现行的药品集中采购规制为背景,构建双寡头竞争制药企业与政府主导的集中采购平台间的双边纳什议价博弈模型,研究制药企业的定价策略、制药企业和集中采购平台的利润分配机制以及制药企业集中采购参与意愿的关键影响因素,探讨集中采购规制对药品价格、医疗机构采购成本、制药企业利润和药品市场配置效率的影响,得到如下主要研究结论:第一,集中采购规制能够降低药品的采购价格和医疗机构的采购成本,但不一定能够提高药品市场的配置效率;第二,若提高集中采购效率或适当降低议价能力,将有助于提高制药企业的集中采购参与意愿,但若竞争对手主动提高集中采购效率或降低议价能力,将会降低制药企业的集中采购参与意愿。第三,议价能力强的制药企业不一定总是获得高利润,企业最终的利润受到企业自身及竞争对手的议价能力、集中采购效率的共同影响;第四,集中采购规制并非总是损害制药企业的利润,在一定条件下,集中采购规制能实现两家制药企业的"双赢"。本研究对提高制药企业集中采购参与意愿,促进制药企业和集中采购平台间的协作,发挥集中采购优势,提高药品市场的配置效率具有现实意义。

关键词: 集中采购规制, 议价能力, 参与意愿, 双边议价博弈

Abstract: Based on the present group procurement regulation for medicines, a bilateral bargaining game between two competing pharmaceutical enterprises and one government-oriented procurement platform is proposed to investigate pharmaceutical enterprises' pricing strategies, profit allocation mechanisms between two enterprises and one procurement platform, and key factors influencing pharmaceutical enterprises' willingness to participate in group procurement. The impacts of group procurement regulation on pharmaceutical enterprises' pricing strategies, profits, providers' procurement costs as well as the allocation efficiency of the medicine market are also discussed. The main results are as follows: First, group procurement regulation for medicines will lower prices and the whole procurement costs for medical providers but does not necessarily improve the social welfare. Second, firm's willingness of participation in group procurement increases with its own group procurement efficiency and its rival's bargaining power, and decreases with its rival's group procurement efficiency and its own bargaining power; Third, a firm higher bargaining power does not necessarily gain higher profit. The final profits of firms depend on the combined factors including enterprise's bargaining power, group procurement efficiency, and its rival's bargaining power and group procurement efficiency. Last, group procurement regulation for medicines does not necessarily lead to lower profits for both pharmaceutical enterprises. On some conditions, two enterprises can achieve "Win-Win" under group procurement regulation. In a word, our results provide practical significances for enhancing pharmaceutical firms' willingness to participate in group procurement, promoting the coordination between pharmaceutical firms and the group procure organization, giving full paly to the advantage of group procurement, and improving the allocation efficiency of the medicine market.

Key words: group procurement regulation, bargaining power, willingness to participate, bilateral bargaining game

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