大股东控制、集团内部资本市场运作与公司现金持有

中国管理科学 ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (4): 124-133.

大股东控制、集团内部资本市场运作与公司现金持有

刘星¹, 计方^1,2, 郝颖¹

1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆 400030;
2. 重庆科技学院工商管理学院, 重庆 401331

收稿日期:2012-05-19 修回日期:2013-03-27 出版日期:2014-04-20 发布日期:2014-04-23
作者简介:刘星（1956- ），男（汉族），河南镇平人，重庆大学经济与工商管理学院教授，博士生导师，研究方向：公司财务与公司治理.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目（71232004）；国家自然科学基金面上资助项目（71172082）；中央高校基本科研业务费（CDJXS12020004）；教育部人文社科基金项目（09YJC630242）

Control of Large Shareholder, Operation of Group’s Internal Capital Market and Corporate Cash Holdings

LIU Xing¹, JI Fang^1,2, HAO Ying¹

1. School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China;
2. School of Business Adminstration Chongqing University of Science & Technology, Chonqing 401331, China

Received:2012-05-19 Revised:2013-03-27 Online:2014-04-20 Published:2014-04-23

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文以我国上市公司高额现金持有和企业集团迅猛发展为背景，从融资约束与代理冲突两个维度，考察了集团内部资本市场运作对成员企业现金持有量的影响，以及在不同内部治理环境下两者对现金持有量所呈现出的迥异的作用机理。以A股上市公司2007—2010年的数据为样本，本研究发现：（1）集团内部资本市场运作通过融资约束与代理冲突这两条路径影响成员企业的现金持有量。综合来看，集团成员企业的现金持有量高于独立企业。（2）在不同的内部治理环境下，预防性动机与代理动机对现金持有量影响程度的大小也不同。当代理问题较严重时，代理动机导致的现金增持程度大于预防动机减弱导致的现金减持程度，从而表现为与独立企业相比具有较高的现金持有量。（3）代理问题较严重的集团成员企业所拥有的实际现金持有量向目标现金持有量的调整速度较慢，调整半周期较长。上述研究结论丰富了委托代理理论与公司财务理论的相关研究成果，并且从集团内部资本市场运作的视角提供了治理机制如何影响公司财务决策的新证据。

关键词: 大股东控制, 集团内部资本市场运作, 现金持有, 动态调整

Abstract: Based on listed companies' high cash holdings and the rapid development of groups, the member companies' cash holdings by internal capital market operation, as well the different mechanism to the cash holdings in different internal governance environment from the two dimensions of financing constraints and agent conflicts are investigated. Based on empirical date sample of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2010, it can be found that firstly, the operation of the group's internal capital market affect the cash holdings of its member companies in two ways—financing constraints and agency conflicts. On the whole, the cash holding of the group members is higher than an independent enterprise.Secondly, In different internal governance environment, the degree of the impact of cash holdings by the precautionary motive and agency motivation is different. When the agent problem is more serious, the increasing extent of cash holdings caused by the agent motivation is greater than the decreasing extent caused by the weakening of the precautionary motive, and thus results in a higher cash holdings compared to independent enterprises.At last, when the agency problem is more serious, the adjustment speed of member companies' cash holdings to the target cash holdings is slower. And the adjustment semi-long cycle is longer. The above findings enrich the corporate organization theory and corporate finance theory, and also provide new evidence of how governance mechanisms affect the companies' financial decision-making from the point of view of the operation of group's internal capital market.

Key words: control of large shareholder, operation of group’s internal capital market, cash holdings, dynamic adjustment

中图分类号:

F830

刘星, 计方, 郝颖. 大股东控制、集团内部资本市场运作与公司现金持有[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(4): 124-133.

LIU Xing, JI Fang, HAO Ying. Control of Large Shareholder, Operation of Group’s Internal Capital Market and Corporate Cash Holdings[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(4): 124-133.

参考文献

[1] Almeida H, Campello M, Weisbach M S.The cash flow sensitivity of cash[J]. Journal of Finance, 2004, 59:1777-1804.

[2] Harford J, Mansi S A, Maxwell W F.Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2008, 87(3):535-555.

[3] Opler T, Pinkowitz L, Stulz R, et al.The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1999, 52(1):535-555.

[4] Ozkan A, Ozkan N.Corporate cash holdings:An empirical investigation of UK companies[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2004, 28(9):2103-2134.

[5] Dittmar A, Smith M.Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2007, 83(3):599-634.

[6] Lensink R, Molen R, Gangopadhyay S.Business groups, financing constraints, and investment: The case of india[R]. Working Paper, SSRN, 2003.

[7] 银莉, 陈收. 集团内部资本市场对外部融资约束的替代效应[J]. 山西财经大学学报, 2010, 32(8):102-109.

[8] Scharfstein D S, Stein J C..The dark side of internal capital markets: Divisional rent-seeking and inefficient investment[J]. Journal of Finance, 2000, 55(6):2537-2564.

[9] 卢建新. 股权结构、公司治理与内部资本市场效率[J]. 中南财经政法大学学报, 2009, 4:120-125

[10] 刘星, 代彬, 郝颖. 掏空、支持与资本投资——来自集团内部资本市场的经验证据[J]. 中国会计评论, 2010, 6:201-222.

[11] Mello R, Krishnaswami S, Larkin J.Determinants of corporate cashholdings: Evidence from spin-offs[J]. Journal of Banking &Finance, 2008, 32(7):1209-1220.

[12] Bertrand M, Mullainathan S.Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and managerial preferences[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 2003, 111(5):1043-1075.

[13] 廖理, 肖作平. 公司治理影响公司现金持有量吗——来自国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 中国工业经济, 2009, 6:98-107.

[14] 刘博研, 韩立岩. 公司治理、不确定性与流动性管理[J]. 世界经济, 2010, 2:141-160.

[15] 李焰, 陈才东, 黄磊. 集团化运作、融资约束与财务风险—基于上海复星集团的案例研究[J]. 管理世界, 2007, 12:117-135.

[16] Peyer U C, Shivdasani A.Leverage and internal capital markets: Evidence from leveraged recapilizations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2001, 59(3):477-515.

[17] Stein J.Agency, information and corporate investment[M]// Constantinides G, Harris M, Stulz R. Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2003, 111-165.

[18] Johnson S, La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, et al. Tunneling[J]. American Economic Review, 2000, 90(2):22-27.

[19] 邵军.代理成本与内部资本市场效率[J]. 上海立信会计学院学报, 2008, 12:16-20.

[20] 罗绮, 许俏晖. 大股东控制影响公司现金持有量的实证分析[J]. 统计研究, 2009, 11:93-99.

[21] 辛清泉, 郑国坚, 杨德明. 企业集团、政府控制与投资效率[J]. 金融研究, 2007, 10:123-142.

[22] Frésard L.Financial strength and product market behavior: The real effects of corporate cash holdings[J]. Journal of Finance, 2010, 65(3):1097-1122.

[23] 连玉君, 刘醒云, 苏治. 现金持有的行业特征:差异性与收敛性[J]. 会计研究, 2011, 7:66-72.

[24] 韩忠雪, 周婷婷. 产品市场竞争、融资约束与公司现金持有:基于中国制造业上市公司的实证分析[J]. 南开管理评论, 2011, 14:149-160.

[25] Garcia T, P J, Martinez S P.On the determinants of SME cash holdings: Evidence from Spain[J]. Journal of Banking Finance & Accounting, 2008, 35(2):127-149.