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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2006, Vol. ›› Issue (3): 45-50.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

易逝品降价时点设定问题的Cournot博弈模型

杨慧1,2, 周晶1   

  1. 1. 南京大学工程管理学院, 南京, 210093;
    2. 南京大学工程管理学院, 南京, 210093
  • 收稿日期:2005-07-03 修回日期:2006-04-13 出版日期:2006-06-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371019);南京理工大学经济管理学院青年基金资助项目

A Cournot Game of Setting Optimal Markdown Timing for Perishable Products

YANG Hui1,2, Zhou Jing1   

  1. 1. School of Management Science & Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093;China;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094, China
  • Received:2005-07-03 Revised:2006-04-13 Online:2006-06-28 Published:2012-03-07

PDF (PC)

1701

被引次数

102

摘要： 本文基于Gallego和van Ryzin的两级价格策略,构建了两种竞争性易逝品降价时点设定问题的Cournot博弈模型,应用图解法求得Cournot均衡点,得出在竞争环境下先动企业会推迟降价时点而后动企业会提前降价的结论,通过实例分析验证了这一结论,同时指出了转移概率对均衡结果的影响.研究结果可为竞争环境下易逝性产品降价策略的制定提供决策支持.

关键词: 易逝品, 收益管理, 动态定价, 博弈

Abstract: This paper deals with a kind of specific retailing that sells a fixed stock of perishable goods over a finite horizon.A Cournot game model is proposed based on Gallego and Van Ryzin's two-price policy.The Cournot equilibrium point is found out in the figure of the strategy sets.It is found that the optimal markdown timing of the leading product will be delayed and that of the following product will be advanced.A numerical example is provided and the effect of the customer's transfer probability p between suppliers on the equilibrium of the game is analyzed.The model proposed in this paper is helpful for the suppliers to determine the markdown timing of perishable products when the competitiveness exists.

Key words: perishable product, revenue management, dynamic pricing, game

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