讨价还价过程与供应链的利润最大化均衡

中国管理科学 ›› 2006, Vol. ›› Issue (1): 37-42.

讨价还价过程与供应链的利润最大化均衡

杜义飞, 李仕明, 林光平

电子科技大学管理学院, 成都, 610054

收稿日期:2005-04-25 修回日期:2006-01-15 出版日期:2006-02-28 发布日期:2012-03-07

Bargaining Process and Equilibrium of Profit-Maximizing for Supply Chain

DU Yi-fei, LI Shi-ming, LIN Guang-ping

School of Management, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, 610054, China

Received:2005-04-25 Revised:2006-01-15 Online:2006-02-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 是否存在一组贴现因子使得轮流出价的讨价还价的完美子博弈均衡刚好实现供应链总体利润最大?本文研究表明当博弈双方的贴现率都趋近于1,各企业利润之和将收敛于供应链的总体利润最大化均衡.接着,证明了当双方的贴现率严格地小于1时,供应链的总体利润不可能达到利润最大化均衡.最后,通过具体的算例来说明所得到的结论.

关键词: 供应链, 讨价还价, 利润最大化均衡

Abstract: Are there a set of discount rates making it possible that the sub-game-perfect equilibrium of alternating-offer bargaining just meet profit-maximizing of supply chain? In this paper,it is indicated that the sum for each firm's profit converges to equilibrium of profit-maximizing for supply chain as the discount rates of both game sides approach 1.Then,we prove that it is impossible to reach profit-maximizing of supply chain when the discount rates of both game sides are strictly less than 1.Finally,we explain our conclusion by an example.

Key words: supply chain, bargaining, equilibrium of profit-maximizing

中图分类号:

杜义飞, 李仕明, 林光平. 讨价还价过程与供应链的利润最大化均衡[J]. 中国管理科学, 2006, (1): 37-42.

DU Yi-fei, LI Shi-ming, LIN Guang-ping. Bargaining Process and Equilibrium of Profit-Maximizing for Supply Chain[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2006, (1): 37-42.

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