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中国管理科学 ›› 2004, Vol. ›› Issue (3): 125-129.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

不同行为规则下的Cournot竞争的演化博弈分析

易余胤, 盛昭瀚, 肖条军   

  1. 南京大学管理科学与工程研究院, 南京, 210093
  • 收稿日期:2003-09-09 出版日期:2004-06-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70171028;70301014)

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Cournot Competition with Different Behavior Rule

YI Yu-yin, SHENG Zhao-han, XIAO Tiao-jun   

  1. Engineering Management College, Nanjing Univevsity, Nanjing 210093, China
  • Received:2003-09-09 Online:2004-06-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要: 研究了一个Cournot竞争的演化博弈模型。企业在两种行为规则中进行选择,一种是"近视眼"行为规则,另一种是纳什行为规则,行为规则被选择的概率由复制者动态方程给出。结论表明:复杂的纳什行为规则不可能淘汰简单的"近视眼"行为规则,并且,在满足一定的条件下,企业都将选择"近视眼"行为规则来进行产量决策,而能否获得均衡产量则取决于企业的理性程度。

关键词: 演化博弈, 行为规则, Cournot竞争

Abstract: An evolutionary game model of Cournot competition is studied.Two behavior rules can be selected by enterprise.One is"myopic"behavior rule,the other is Nash behavior rule.The probability of the enterprise choosing a certain behavioral rule is updated according to the replicator equation.Our results show that"myopic"behavior rule cannot be washed out by Nash behavior rule,and enterprise will select"myopic"behavior rule to make quantitative decision when it has certain rationality,and its rationality determines whether this game can reach equilibrium.

Key words: evolutionary game, behavior rule, Cournot competition

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