基于获取决策优先权的零售商战略联盟效益分析

中国管理科学 ›› 2004, Vol. ›› Issue (1): 57-63.

基于获取决策优先权的零售商战略联盟效益分析

钟德强^1,2, 仲伟俊¹

1. 东南大学经济管理学院, 江苏, 南京, 210096;
2. 株洲工学院管理科学与工程研究所, 湖南, 株洲, 412008

收稿日期:2003-01-20 修回日期:2003-10-15 出版日期:2004-02-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70171025);湖南省自然科学基金资助项目(02JJY5017)

Retailers Strategic Alliances Based on Acquiring Decision Rights Leadership

ZHONG De-qiang^1,2, ZHONG Wei-jun¹

1. School of Economics & Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China;
2. Zhuzhou Institute of Technology, Zhuzhou 412008, China

Received:2003-01-20 Revised:2003-10-15 Online:2004-02-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 对于由一个供应商和多个零售商组成的单一产品、单周期供应链,在确定型市场、零售商成本对称以及供应商具有关于零售商成本结构完全信息的情况下,考虑了同时带来运作成本与决策权分配变化(基于获取决策优先权)的零售商定货数量决策联盟。利用博弈论方法,研究了获取决策优先权的零售商战略联盟对参与联盟的零售商、未参与联盟的零售商、供应商以及供应链整体收益的影响。证明这种零售商战略联盟不可能使供应链中所有成员都同时增加收益。但在一定的条件下,联盟能实现某种部分"多赢";使供应链整体、供应商和参与联盟的零售商收益增加,或使供应商和参与联盟的零售商收益增加。

关键词: 运作成本, 决策权优势, 战略联盟, 运作效益

Abstract: In this paper,we consider a single-supplier multi-retailers supply chain with single-product facing price-sensitive deterministic demand,and the supplier has complete information about retailers’ cost structure,the retailers have same cost structure.We examine strategic alliances among retailers acquiring decision rights leadership,and study the reflection of the strategic alliances among on the performance of retailers in and out of the alliance,the supplier and the total supply-chain.It is shown that the strategic alliances retailers can’t be profitable to all members of the supply-chain,but may be profitable to some members of the supply-chain in some case.

Key words: operating cost, decision right leadership, strategic alliances, performance

中图分类号:

F271

钟德强, 仲伟俊. 基于获取决策优先权的零售商战略联盟效益分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2004, (1): 57-63.

ZHONG De-qiang, ZHONG Wei-jun. Retailers Strategic Alliances Based on Acquiring Decision Rights Leadership[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2004, (1): 57-63.

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