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中国管理科学 ›› 2001, Vol. ›› Issue (2): 65-70.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

公司治理的政府介入结构分析

向锐, 曹国华, 杨秀苔   

  1. 重庆大学工商管理学院, 四川重庆400044
  • 收稿日期:2000-03-21 修回日期:2001-01-18 出版日期:2001-04-28 发布日期:2012-03-06

An Analysis of Government Involvement in Corporate Governance Mechanisms

XIANG Rui, CHAO Guo-hua, YANG Xiu-tai   

  1. Faculty of Business Adimnistration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China
  • Received:2000-03-21 Revised:2001-01-18 Online:2001-04-28 Published:2012-03-06

摘要: 针对当前我国股份公司治理机制的现状,本文构造了一个相应的模型,应用博弈论方法证明,政府过度介入公司治理将严重影响公司运行效率,认为国有资产应当尽快退出产业部门,以此消除国有企业改革的产权障碍,并且指出这应是当前最为急迫的一项任务。

关键词: 公司治理, 代理问题, 博弈分析

Abstract: In this paper,the model has been constructed corresponding to the present situation of corporate governance mechanisms in ChinaWith game theory,it is proved that the efficiency in corporate operation will be affected seriously by the governance mechanism in which the Government is involved excessivelyWe consider that the Government should withdraw State-owned property from industries as soon as possible and it should be a most urgent task at present to eliminate barriers of property rights in reformed state-owned enterprises

Key words: corporate governance, agency problem, game-theoretic analysis

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