中国管理科学 ›› 2020, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (9): 86-97.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.09.009
李佩1, 魏航2, 王广永3, 付娜2
收稿日期:
2018-06-23
修回日期:
2019-02-25
出版日期:
2020-09-20
发布日期:
2020-09-25
通讯作者:
李佩(1983-),女(汉族),湖南益阳人,上海立信会计金融学院,讲师,博士,研究方向:供应链管理、电子商务,E-mail:lipei_1020@126.com.
E-mail:lipei_1020@126.com
基金资助:
LI Pei1, WEI Hang2, WANG Guang-yong3, FU Na2
Received:
2018-06-23
Revised:
2019-02-25
Online:
2020-09-20
Published:
2020-09-25
摘要: 随着互联网的发展,"新零售"表现形式之一的纵向整合成为零售商转型升级的重要策略。考虑了产品之间竞争性,分别研究了分销模式、平台模式和混合模式下,零售商采取不进行纵向整合、前向整合和后向整合的利润,通过对比给出零售商最优的纵向整合策略选择条件。最后,分析了不同经营模式对零售商纵向整合策略选择的影响。研究发现:第一,随着潜在需求的增加,在三种经营模式下零售商的最优策略都从不进行纵向整合变为后向整合、前向整合;第二,随着产品之间竞争程度增加,在分销模式和平台模式下,零售商的最优策略从后向整合变为不进行纵向整合、前向整合,在混合模式下,零售商的最优策略从后向整合或不进行纵向整合变为前向整合;第三,随着佣金费率增加,在平台模式下,零售商的最优策略从前向整合变为后向整合、不进行纵向整合,在混合模式下,零售商的最优策略从前向整合或后向整合制造商2变为不进行纵向整合、后向整合制造商1。
中图分类号:
李佩, 魏航, 王广永, 付娜. 考虑不同经营模式的零售商纵向整合策略选择:前向,后向还是不整合?[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(9): 86-97.
LI Pei, WEI Hang, WANG Guang-yong, FU Na. Retailer's Vertical Integration Strategy under Different Business Models: Forward, Backward, or No Integration?[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(9): 86-97.
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