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中国管理科学 ›› 2006, Vol. ›› Issue (6): 22-28.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

TOT项目融资中国有资产转让定价的博弈分析

杨畅   

  1. 上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院, 上海, 200433
  • 收稿日期:2005-05-08 修回日期:2006-11-13 出版日期:2006-12-28 发布日期:2012-03-07

How to Fix the Price of the National Assets,the Game Theory in the TOT Project Finance

YANG Chang   

  1. School of Public Economics & Administration, Shanghai University of Finance & Economics, Shanghai 200433, China
  • Received:2005-05-08 Revised:2006-11-13 Online:2006-12-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要: 本文以TOT项目融资方式为对象,运用博弈的方法,从合理分配国有资产经营期内增值收入的角度出发,得出这样的结论,在国有资产转让过程中,政府与私营资本之间的谈判是一系列复杂的博弈过程,在博弈中政府的最优行为是对国有资产转让进行招标,同时给予某一招标企业一定的中标优先权,这样政府能够较现行的国有资产转让方式获得更多的收益.

关键词: TOT项目融资, 国有资产, 转让, 定价, 博弈分析

Abstract: By using the game theory and pointing to the TOT project finance,this article attempts to find the best way to distribute the increment of national assets rationally between the government and private capital.It concludes that the negotiations between the government and private capital are a series of complex games in the transference of national assets.The best choice for government is to invite a public bidding,at the same time the government can give some advantage to one firm.In this way,the government can get more benefit than in normal ways.

Key words: TOT project finance, national assets, transfer, fix the price, game theory

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