零售货架的线性补贴策略与供应链协调

中国管理科学 ›› 2006, Vol. ›› Issue (2): 52-57.

零售货架的线性补贴策略与供应链协调

贾涛, 徐渝, 赵六超

西安交通大学管理学院, 陕西, 西安, 710049

收稿日期:2005-05-08 修回日期:2005-12-11 出版日期:2006-04-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70472036)

Retail Shelf Linear Subsidy Policy and Supply Chain Coordination

JIA Tao, XU Yu, ZHAO Liu-chao

School of Management, Xi'an Jiao tong University, Xi'an 710049, China

Received:2005-05-08 Revised:2005-12-11 Online:2006-04-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商构成的供应链,供应商提供零售商单一产品,零售阶段的市场需求量随机地依赖于零售商的货架展示量。由于货架空间的稀缺,零售商的成本为非线性的成本函数以符合实际的情况。如果零售商在观察到需求之前决定货架空间,货架补贴可以提高渠道效率;如果零售商在观察需求之后,进行货架决策,补贴降低了供应链效率。由于零售商的努力水平可以验证,供应商可以使用回购加零售货架的线性补贴策略协调供应链,但是需要考虑零售阶段的库存决策与货架分配的决策顺序,而采取完全不同的协调方式。最后通过数值算例说明了所得结论。

关键词: 供应链, 库存, 货架面积, 商业促销

Abstract: This paper considers a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer.The supplier provides an item to the retailer facing demand assumed to be randomly increasing in the shelf space allocated to that product;the retailer's effort cost is a non-linear function as the shelf space is a limited resource.When the retailer chooses shelf space before observing demand,the shelf space subsidy policy may improve the efficiency of the channel;if the retailer chooses shelf space after observing demand,the subsidy policy reduce the efficiency.Because the level of retailer's effort is verifiable,coupling buy back with a linear subsidy mechanism for the shelf space,the supplier could coordinate the channel,which is based on the sequence of the inventory and the effort decision of the retailer.For the different sequence the supplier have to choose completely different coordinating procedure.Finally the results were analyzed by conducting numerical examples.

Key words: supply chain, inventory, shelf space, sales promotion

中图分类号:

F274

贾涛, 徐渝, 赵六超. 零售货架的线性补贴策略与供应链协调[J]. 中国管理科学, 2006, (2): 52-57.

JIA Tao, XU Yu, ZHAO Liu-chao. Retail Shelf Linear Subsidy Policy and Supply Chain Coordination[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2006, (2): 52-57.

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