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中国管理科学 ›› 2004, Vol. ›› Issue (6): 118-122.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

大股东与经营者合谋行为及法律约束措施

潘泽清1, 张维2,1   

  1. 1. 天津大学管理学院 天津 300072;
    2. 天津财经学院 天津 300222
  • 收稿日期:2003-12-23 修回日期:2004-09-13 出版日期:2004-12-28 发布日期:2012-03-07

The Collusion of Large Shareholder with Manager and Legal Shareholder Protection

PAN Ze-qing1, ZHANG Wei2,1   

  1. 1. School of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China;
    2. Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China
  • Received:2003-12-23 Revised:2004-09-13 Online:2004-12-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要: 大股东侵害中小股东利益的行为是一种大股东与经营者合谋牟取私下收益的行为,在合谋状态下,大股东的监督检查强度高于非合谋状态.大股东与经营者的合谋行为导致中小股东收入水平下降,它不仅把中小股东应得的利益转移到大股东手中;而且还会降低公司的收入水平.要求大股东承担诚信义务是规范大股东行为的最主要法律措施.

关键词: 大股东, 合谋, 私下收益, 诚信义务

Abstract: The expropriation on the benefit of small shareholders by large shareholders is achieved through the latter’s collusion with manager to seek private benefits.When acting in collusion,large shareholders take more intensive supervising measures than usual.The collusion between large shareholders and manager not only leads to decrease in earnings of the small shareholders due to large shareholders’ expropriation on their due benefit,but also results in decrease in companies’ return.Requiring large shareholders to shoulder fiduciary duty is thus the major legal method to bring their acts in control.

Key words: large shareholder, collusion, private benefits, fiduciary duty

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