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中国管理科学 ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (1): 168-176.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.2613

• • 上一篇    

考虑局部市场间用户移动的竞争平台广告投放和定价研究

周永意,张玉林()   

  1. 东南大学经济管理学院,江苏 南京 211189
  • 收稿日期:2021-12-15 修回日期:2022-07-08 出版日期:2024-01-25 发布日期:2024-02-08
  • 通讯作者: 张玉林 E-mail:zhangyl@seu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金面上项目(72071040);国家社会科学基金重大项目(21&ZD118);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(2242022S30020);江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划(KYCX20_0164);中国国家留学基金管理委员会资助项目(202006090308)

Optimal Pricing and Advertising of Competitive Platforms in Local Market with Mobile Service Providers

Yongyi Zhou,Yulin Zhang()   

  1. School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China
  • Received:2021-12-15 Revised:2022-07-08 Online:2024-01-25 Published:2024-02-08
  • Contact: Yulin Zhang E-mail:zhangyl@seu.edu.cn

摘要:

本文构建一个带有移动服务提供方的局部家政市场中在位平台与进入平台竞争模型,研究进入平台如何通过广告策略切入局部市场,而在位平台如何对进入平台的广告行为进行定价策略反应,以及移动服务提供方对竞争平台广告投放和定价策略的影响。结果表明:(1)若进入平台投放高强度广告,在位平台则选择支付高工资进行回应;当局部市场规模较大时,进入平台将会获得大量市场份额,但利润总为负。(2)若进入平台投放低强度广告,在位平台则选择不回应进入平台,即继续收取垄断价格和支付垄断工资。更多的移动服务提供方也会降低在位平台对进入平台的回应动机,这时进入平台的市场份额和利润可能会高于在位平台。(3)当进入平台投放全覆盖式广告时,在位平台是否选择回应进入平台的广告是由服务提供方和买方的切换成本决定的。

关键词: 在位平台, 进入平台, 广告投放, 局部市场, 移动服务提供方

Abstract:

How an incumbent platform responds to the advertisement of an entrant platform in a market of mobile service providers is examined. It is found that: (1) If the entrant platform offers high-intensity advertising, the incumbent platform will give a higher wage on the service provider side to response the entrant. When the local market is relatively large, the entrant platform will capture market share, but its profit always is negative. (2) If the entrant platform has low-intensity advertising, the incumbent platform will not respond to the entrant, that is, the incumbent will continue to charge monopoly price and offer monopoly wage. Additionally, more mobile service providers who enter the local market also reduce the incumbent platform’s motivation to response the entrant. In such a case, the market share and profit of the entrant may be higher than the incumbent. (3) When the entrant platform has full-coverage advertising, the platform’s choice to respond or not depends on the switching costs of the service provider and the buyer.

Key words: incumbent platform, entrant platform, advertising, local market, mobile service provider

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