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中国管理科学 ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (5): 230-239.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1306

• 论文 • 上一篇    

基于销售量谎报的供应链审计及价格补贴策略

周建亨, 罗瑶   

  1. 东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海200051
  • 收稿日期:2020-07-09 修回日期:2020-10-22 发布日期:2023-05-23
  • 通讯作者: 罗瑶(1993-),女(汉族),山东临沂人,东华大学旭日工商管理学院,博士研究生,研究方向:供应链管理、运营管理,Email:2228217145@qq.com. E-mail:2228217145@qq.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71872036,71832001);教育部人文社会科学项目(18YJA630153);中央高校基本科研业务专项资金资助项目(2232018H-07)

Audit and Markdown Contract in The Presence of Dishonest Reporting

ZHOU Jian-heng, LUO Yao   

  1. Glorious Sun School of Business & Management, Donghua University, Shanghai 200051, China
  • Received:2020-07-09 Revised:2020-10-22 Published:2023-05-23
  • Contact: 罗瑶 E-mail:2228217145@qq.com

摘要: 价格补贴契约在时效性较强的易逝性产品(比如时尚产品或生鲜产品)销售领域广泛应用。在应对被补贴方的谎报行为方面,不同于经典的消除双方信息不对称的研究思路,本文讨论放松审计的最优策略。建立了需求不确定下品牌商和零售商组成的二级供应链模型,品牌商通过价格补贴契约对零售商每一个未售出的产品进行补偿。放松了价格补贴契约下零售商真实上报销售量的假设,本文分别讨论了两种审计策略,即激励真实上报的全面审计以及允许谎报的阈值审计。通过分析发现,在阈值审计下零售商因额外获得“投机性”补偿而愿意增加订货,因此零售商漏报行为的内在动力与整个供应链的目标一致,从而缓解了双重边际化效应的影响。且与激励真实上报的全面审计策略相比,该策略会增加品牌商以及供应链的期望收益。与经典的追求信息全面对称或共享的状态不同,本文发现,当信息不全面透明时,反而可能获得比完全信息更优的结果。

关键词: 价格补贴契约;供应链审计;订货策略

Abstract: Markdown contract is prevalent in industries selling perishable goods with uncertain demand, e.g., fashion apparel, fresh products, and newspapers. It is a form that the fashion brand pays a rebate credit to the retailer for each unsold unit only based on reported sales at the end of the regular selling season. Since the retailer is closer to the market and may also have better expertise in observing the basic demand of the market than the fashion brand (i.e., the sales are the retailer’s private information), the fashion brand has to try to eliminate or curb underreporting of sales. A large percentage of the literature (e.g., screening model and traditional auditing) on dishonest reporting focuses on inducing truthful information revelation strictly. Rather than this, the “relaxed” auditing strategy is considered explicitly that leaves room for underreporting and optimal order quantity is investigated in a supply chain consisting of a fashion brand and a retailer. First, the benchmark scenario is considered where the fashion brand uses a comprehensive auditing strategy to encourage true reporting. Second, the retailer’s optimal order quantity and the fashion brand’s optimal threshold are analyzed under a threshold auditing strategy to allow underreporting. Finally, the supply chain expected profits are compared under comprehensive and threshold auditing strategy. Analyses reveal that the retailer is willing to increase the order quantity since the retailer gains an additional compensation under threshold auditing strategy. Hence, the incentives of underreporting are more consistent with that of the overall supply chain, which mitigates double marginalization. Additionally, the supply chain and fashion brand expected profits can be increased by threshold auditing strategy. Unlike the screening model and traditional auditing literature, which induce truthful sales reporting by the retailer, the threshold auditing strategy to allow underreporting can do better when the retailer has private information about its demand than when this information is public. The analyses provide some guidelines for the fashion brands as they design markdown contract in situations where they do not know the demand the retailer faces. Hence, the fashion brands can relax auditing strategy and allow the retailers to be free to report sales to some extent when work with them, which not only promotes close cooperation, but also improves the overall supply chain performance.

Key words: markdown contracts; audit; ordering strategy

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