中国管理科学 ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (1): 113-127.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0494
冯颖, 林晴, 张景雄, 张炎治
收稿日期:
2020-03-24
修回日期:
2020-08-10
出版日期:
2023-01-20
发布日期:
2023-02-09
通讯作者:
张炎治(1977-),男(汉族),河南巩义人,中国矿业大学经济管理学院,副教授,博士,研究方向:物流与供应链管理,Email:zyzcumt2003@163.com.
E-mail:zyzcumt2003@163.com
基金资助:
FENG Ying, LIN Qing, ZHANG Jing-xiong, ZHANG Yan-zhi
Received:
2020-03-24
Revised:
2020-08-10
Online:
2023-01-20
Published:
2023-02-09
Contact:
张炎治
E-mail:zyzcumt2003@163.com
摘要: 针对由供应商、第三方物流服务商和零售商组成的供应链,考虑供需双方将物流服务联合外包给第三方物流服务商、共同承担运费的情形,探究供应商管理库存和寄售库存两类库存管理模式的引入对供应链运作及合同设计的影响。分别在传统的零售商管理库存、仅引入寄售库存的零售商管理寄售库存以及同时引入供应商管理库存和寄售库存的供应商管理寄售库存三种模式下,构建了第三方物流服务商主导、供应商和零售商跟随的序贯非合作博弈模型,证明了所有模式下均衡的订购量/寄售量均存在且唯一,并探讨了均衡结果随零售商运费分摊比例、转移支付价格两个关键参数的变化。横向对比三种模式下的均衡结果和集中决策下的最优结果,发现:零售商管理库存模式下的均衡订购量总是低于零售商管理寄售库存模式以及集中决策下的结果,而其他库存管理模式下的订购量并非一定低于集中决策下的结果;不同库存管理模式下,均衡状态下的订购量/寄售量及供应链总的期望收益大小关系取决于供应商和零售商的类边际(毛利)贡献率,从而表明,供应链环境下,上下游成员企业的收益结构、盈利水平等对于库存决策及库存模式的选取有重要影响。此外,在绝大多数情形下,不同库存管理模式下的均衡订购量与集中决策下的最优订购量不相等,故供应链总的期望收益会出现不同程度的损失。在零售商和供应商之间引入双向调节契约,通过调节契约参数的取值范围,可在三种模式下实现供应链完美协调,并给出了各模式下系统实现帕累托改善的参数条件。
中图分类号:
冯颖, 林晴, 张景雄, 张炎治. 物流联合外包下库存管理模式对供应链运作的影响[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(1): 113-127.
FENG Ying, LIN Qing, ZHANG Jing-xiong, ZHANG Yan-zhi. The Impact of the Inventory Management Mode on the Operation of a Supply Chain with Logistics Joint Outsourcing[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(1): 113-127.
[1] Sarker B R. Consignment stocking policy models for supply chain systems: a critical review and comparative perspectives[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2014, 155(S1): 52-67. [2] Bylka S, Górny P. The consignment stock of inventories in coordinated model with generalized policy[J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2015, 82: 54-64. [3] As’ad R, Hariga M, Alkhatib O. Two stage closed loop supply chain models under consignment stock agreement and different procurement strategies[J]. Applied Mathematical Modelling, 2019, 65: 164-186. [4] Zahran S K, Jaber M Y. Investigation of a consignment stock and a traditional inventory policy in a three-level supply chain system with multiple-suppliers and multiple-buyers[J]. Applied Mathematical Modelling, 2017, 44: 390-408. [5] Zahran S K, Jaber M Y, Zanoni S. The consignment stock case for a vendor and a buyer with delay-in-payments[J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2016, 98: 333-349. [6] Cetinkaya S, Lee C Y. Stock replenishment and shipment scheduling for vendor managed inventory systems[J]. Management Science, 2000, 46(2): 217-232. [7] Disney S M, Towill D R. The effect of vendor managed inventory (VMI) dynamics on the Bullwhip effect in supply chains[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2003, 85(2): 199-215. [8] Yu Yugang, Huang G Q, Liang Liang. Stackelberg game-theoretic model for optimizing advertising, pricing and inventory policies in vendor managed inventory (VMI) production supply chains[J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2009, 57(1): 368-382. [9] Diabat A. Hybrid algorithm for a vendor managed inventory system in a two-echelon supply chain[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2014, 238(1): 114-121. [10] Cai Jianhu, Tadikamalla P R, Shang J, et al. Optimal inventory decisions under vendor managed inventory: substitution effects and replenishment tactics[J]. Applied Mathematical Modelling, 2017, 43: 611-629. [11] Giovanni P D, Karray S, Martín H G. Vendor Management Inventory with consignment contracts and the benefits of cooperative advertising[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2019, 272(2): 465-480. [12] Ru Jun, Wang Yunzeng. Consignment contracting: who should control inventory in the supply chain?[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, 201(3): 760-769. [13] Hu Wei, Li Yongjian, Govindan K. The impact of consumer returns policies on consignment contracts with inventory control[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2014, 233(2): 398-407. [14] Lu Xin, Shang J, Wu Shinyi, et al. Impacts of supplier hubris on inventory decisions and green manufacturing endeavors[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2015, 245(1): 121-132. [15] Yu Haiyan, Tang Linglang, Xu Yinfeng, et al. How much does VMI better than RMI in a global environment?[J] International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 170: 268-274. [16] Wong W K, Qi J, Leung S Y S. Coordinating supply chains with sales rebate contracts and vendor-managed inventory[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2009, 120: 151-161. [17] Lee J Y, Cho R K. Contracting for vendor-managed inventory with consignment stock and stockout-cost sharing[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2014, 151: 158-173. [18] 刘云志, 樊治平. 模糊需求下考虑供应商公平偏好的VMI供应链协调[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2016, 36(7): 1661-1675.Liu Yunzhi, Fan Zhiping. VMI supply chain coordination considering fuzzy demand and the supplier’s fair preference[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory & Practice, 2016, 36(7):1661-1675. [19] 刘云志,樊治平.不公平厌恶下VMI供应链的批发价格契约与协调[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(4): 63-73.Liu Yunzhi, Fan Zhiping. VMI supply chain coordination with wholesale price contract incorporating unfair aversion[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(4): 63-73. [20] 冯颖, 吴茜, 张炎治, 等. VMCI下基于剩余产品成本分摊的生鲜农产品供应链协调[J]. 系统管理学报, 2019, 28(3): 579-586.Feng Ying, Wu Qian, Zhang Yanzhi, et al. Supply chain coordination of fresh agri-product based on cost allocation of residual products under VMCI[J]. Journal of Systems & Management, 2019, 28(3): 579-586. [21] 冯颖, 周莹, 贺超, 等. VMCI模式下考虑物流联合外包的供应链合同设计[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2020, 40(3): 617-629.Feng Ying, Zhou Ying, He Chao, et al. Contracts design for a supply chain with logistics joint outsourcing under VMCI mode[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory & Practice, 2020, 40(3): 617-629. [22] 王小斌.VMCI下供应链模糊需求信息共享价值与协调[J]. 系统工程学报, 2013, 28(6): 795-803.Wang Xiaobin. Value of information sharing and coordination in supply chain under fuzzy demand and VMCI environments[J]. Journal of System engineering, 2013, 28(6): 795-803. [23] Sainathan A, Groenevelt H. Vendor managed inventory contracts-coordinating the supply chain while looking from the vendor’s perspective[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2019, 272(1): 249-260. [24] 吕芹, 霍佳震, 高峻峻. VMI模式下3PL介入的供应链Shapley利益分配机制[J]. 计算机集成制造系统, 2013, 19(11): 2877-2883.Lu Qin, Huo Jiazhen, Gao Junjun. Shapley profit distribution mechanism of 3PL involved supply chain based on VMI mode[J]. Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems, 2013, 19(11): 2877-2883. [25] 颜波,刘艳萍, 夏畅. 集中控制型VMI&TPL集群式供应链的补货决策和协调契约[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2015, 35(8): 1968-1982.Yan Bo, Liu Yanping, Xia Chang. Replenishment decision making and coordination contract of cluster supply chain in a centralized VMI & TPL system[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory & Practice, 2015, 35(8): 1968-1982. [26] 邹勇. 基于最大熵值法的VMI&TPL模式利益分配机制[J]. 系统科学学报, 2018, 26(1): 100-104.Zou Yong. Research on profit distribution mechanism of VMI & TPL model based on maximum entropy[J]. Journal of System Science, 2018, 26(1): 100-104. [27] 李雷, 杨怀珍, 冯中伟. 供应链上游段VMI&TPL模式的利益分配机制——基于最大熵值法与正交投影法的整合视角[J]. 系统管理学报, 2020, 29(2): 400-408.Li Lei, Yang Huaizhen, Feng Zhongwei. Profit distribution mechanism of VMI & TPL mode at upstream section of supply chain based on the perspective of integration of the maximum entropy method and vertical projection method[J]. Journal of Systems & Management, 2020, 29(2): 400-408. [28] Han Jialin, Lu Jie, Zhang Guangquan. Tri-level decision-making for decentralized vendor-managed inventory[J]. Information Sciences, 2017, 421: 85-103. [29] 卿前恺, 张登先, 应保胜. 基于分散决策的VMI & TPL供应链收益共享机制研究[J]. 武汉科技大学学报, 2016, 39(5): 393-400.Qing Qiankai, Zhang Dengxian, Ying Baosheng. Revenue sharing mechanisms based on decentralized decision-making in a VMI &TPL supply chain[J]. Journal of Wuhan University of Science and Technology, 2016, 39(5): 393-400. [30] 沙金, 王爱虎. 三级供应链VMI收益及Shapley值分配仿真研究[J]. 工业工程与管理, 2016, 21(3): 12-17+24.Sha Jin, Wang Aihu. Simulation study on revenue and shapley value distribution of VMI on three-echelon supply chain[J]. Industrial Engineering and Management, 2016, 21(3): 12-17+24. [31] Gerard P C. The allocation of inventory risk in a supply chain: push, pull and advance—purchase discount contracts[J]. Management Science, 2004, 50(2): 222-238. |
[1] | 熊强,练帅,李治文,金帅. 双边道德风险下软件供应链信息安全责任协调契约设计[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(10): 265-274. |
[2] | 姜涛,高丽,刘露,柴旭东. 队列中的信息异构:基于口碑传播的等待制服务系统定价决策[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(10): 123-132. |
[3] | 黄苒,胡丽琴,李梦圆. 专有关系投资、议价力与企业违约风险[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(9): 11-23. |
[4] | 张艳芬,徐琪,孙中苗. 供应商竞争下考虑道德风险的平台供应链最优动态激励契约[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(9): 160-170. |
[5] | 李恒宇,柴俊武. 溢出效应下制造商的直播带货策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(9): 171-181. |
[6] | 王鹏,王要玉,王建才. 零售平台自有品牌与制造商渠道策略的竞合博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(9): 214-224. |
[7] | 李进,刘格格,张海霞,张江华. 基于消费者绿色偏好和渠道竞争的制造商分散式入侵策略[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(7): 281-290. |
[8] | 冯颖,魏敏,何文豪,张炎治. 质量信息不对称下考虑参考价格效应的灰市供应链定价决策[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(6): 207-218. |
[9] | 李志鹏,周晓宇. 考虑消费者餍足效应的网络视频产业链最优决策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(6): 229-239. |
[10] | 马德青,王晓晴,胡劲松. 多渠道零售下考虑消费者反展厅现象的平台型供应链销售模式选择[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(5): 133-146. |
[11] | 孙中苗,徐琪,张艳芬. 信息不对称下按需服务平台拥有不同类型代理人时的动态激励契约[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(5): 241-253. |
[12] | 熊一凡. 多重行动异质网络博弈[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(5): 265-274. |
[13] | 赵丹,严啸宸,汪和平,李艳. 双积分政策下汽车企业合作创新演化博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(4): 279-292. |
[14] | 李波,张春燕,张俊飚. 食品企业质量安全意识提升的演化博弈逻辑[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(4): 315-324. |
[15] | 杨松,张言彩,王爱峰. 多主体参与下食品安全社会共治演化博弈稳定性[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(4): 325-334. |
阅读次数 | ||||||
全文 |
|
|||||
摘要 |
|
|||||
|