行业自律机制下P2P网贷平台违规治理演化博弈

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0159

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 行业自律是政府“强监管”背景下P2P网贷平台违规治理的重要组成部分。为揭示行业自律机制下网贷市场主体间行为策略关系及其动态演化机理，建立了包括自律监管平台、网贷平台和平台客户三方主体的行为策略演化博弈模型，分析三方主体行为策略演化路径及其联动作用规律，并结合数值仿真讨论不同约束情景下模型系统演化均衡状态及关键因素影响。结果表明：网贷平台合规运营意愿会随激励水平、形象效应、客户流失量、行业危机风险的上升而增强。若网贷平台拥有较完善运营机制、较好口碑形象或较大客户规模，其更易实现基于市场途径的自我规制。违规惩罚力度、形象效应收益及平台客户规制策略敏感性会直接影响网贷平台合规运营趋势。结合仿真分析结果，提出了加大对违规平台的惩罚力度，强化平台信息披露与品牌形象建设，引导借贷双方理性选择入驻平台等治理建议。

关键词: 行业自律；P2P网贷平台；违规治理；演化博弈

Abstract: Industry self-regulation is an important part of the governance of violations of P2P online loan platforms under the background of "strong supervision" by the government. In order to reveal the behavior strategy relationship and dynamic evolution mechanism among the online lending market entities under the industry self-regulatory mechanism, atrilateral evolutionary game model of behavior strategy including self-regulatory supervision platform, online loan platform and platform customer is constructed. The evolutionary path of the tripartite agent's behavior strategy and its joint action law are analyzed, and then the equilibrium state of model system evolution and the influence of key factors under different constraints are discussed in conjunction with numerical simulation. The findings show that the willingness of the online loan platform to operate in compliance will be strengthened with the increase of incentive level, image effects, customer churn, and industry crisis risks. If the online loan platform has a more complete operation mechanism, or a better reputation, or a larger customer scale, it will be easier to implement self-regulation based on the market approach. The penalties for violations, the benefits of image effects and the sensitivity of the platform’s customers’ regulatory strategies will directly affect the tendency of compliance operation of the online loan platform. Finally, governance measures such as increasing the punishment of illegal platforms, strengthening platform information disclosure and brand image construction, and guiding both borrowers and lenders to choose platforms rationally are put forward combined with the results of simulation analysis.

Key words: industry self-discipline; P2P lending platform; violation governance; evolutionary game

中图分类号:

F832.4

李冬冬, 李春发, 王晟锴. 行业自律机制下P2P网贷平台违规治理演化博弈[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(10): 96-108.

LI Dong-dong, LI Chun-fa, WANG Sheng-kai. Evolutionary Game of P2P Lending Platform Illegal Governance under Industry Self-Regulatory[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(10): 96-108.

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