建设用地指标和建设用地的序贯拍卖定价机制研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.2095

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 现行建设用地指标定价机制未能有效反映其真实价值，使得农民缺乏复垦闲置宅基地来提供建设用地指标的意愿。针对指标和建设用地的互补性特点，以及指标价值是开发商私人信息的特征，本文构建第一价格和第二价格两种密封拍卖下的互补品序贯拍卖模型，研究建设用地指标和建设用地的定价机制。理论和仿真分析得出两种拍卖下的建设用地指标和建设用地价格，并通过对比分析得出不同目标下的最优定价机制。研究发现，两种拍卖下，竞标人的建设用地指标报价均随着土地价格增值系数增加而提高，随着竞标人数递增而降低；序贯二价下的竞标人建设用地指标及建设用地的报价均高于序贯一价；序贯二价下，持有建设用地指标的竞标人获得建设用地的概率更高。因此，地方政府可采用适当提高土地闲置费用的方法，以此提高失地农民复垦权益，激励农民复垦闲置宅基地，增加建设用地指标供给；同时，采用序贯二价拍卖，提高建设用地指标和土地的利用效率。

关键词: 建设用地指标；定价机制；互补品序贯拍卖；指标供给；土地利用效率

Abstract: With the accelerating urbanization in China, the paradox between the idle homesteads in rural area and the shortage of construction land in urban area due to the lack of quota became more and more intensified. Hence, local governments encourage farmers to reclaim their idle homesteads into farmland to generate quota. However, the current price of quota, which is based on the cost of land reclamation, is unable to motivate farmers. Therefore, according to the main characteristics of the quota transaction, the first price sealed-bid sequential auction and the second price sealed-bid sequential auction are built with complementarity. Furthermore, the influence of relevant factors on the bidding price of construction land and its quota is studied through theoretical and numerical analysis under two kinds of sequential auction. The results indicate that the bidding price of the quota is affected by the number of bidders and the fine on a developer for it delaying construction. More specifically, under two kinds of sequential auction, the bidding price decreases with the increase of the number of bidders, but increases with the rise of the fine. And the bidding price of the bidder who gets the quota in the land auction increases with the increase of the parameter of land price appreciation. It is found that the bidding price of quota and construction land in second price seal-bid auction are higher. Then, it is recommended that the local governments should appropriately increase the fine for delaying construction to raise the bidding price of the quota. As a result, the farmers’ income is raised and more farmers are encouraged to reclaim idle homesteads. It might also be beneficial for easing conflict between demand of construction land and farmland protection, and further promoting the sustainable development of China’s social economy. Meanwhile, in the second price sealed-bid auction, the bidder who wins the quota has a higher probability to obtain the construction land, which is more conducive to improve the utilization efficiency of the quota and construction land, and realize the optimal allocation of land resources.

Key words: construction land quota; pricing mechanism; sequential auction with complementarity; quota supply; land use efficiency

中图分类号:

F301

刘靖羽, 孟卫东, 黄波, 李宇雨. 建设用地指标和建设用地的序贯拍卖定价机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(5): 109-117.

LIU Jing-yu, MENG Wei-dong, HUANG Bo, LI Yu-yu. Pricing Mechanism of Sequential Auction for the Construction Land and Its Quota[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(5): 109-117.

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