家族董事席位超额控制与股价崩盘风险——基于关联交易的视角

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.1652

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文基于关联交易的视角，以2008-2017年沪深A股上市家族企业为研究对象，考察了家族董事席位超额控制程度与股价崩盘风险之间的关系。研究发现，家族董事席位超额控制程度与企业的股价崩盘风险、控股家族的关联交易行为正相关；同时，控股家族的关联交易行为对企业股价崩盘风险有显著的正向影响，并且这种影响在家族董事席位超额控程度较高的公司中更为明显。进一步分析发现，机构持股比例较低、两职合一、董事会规模较小时，家族董事席位超额控制程度与企业的股价崩盘风险、控股家族的关联交易规模之间的正相关性更强；控股家族的关联交易规模对企业股价崩盘风险的正向影响更显著，其与家族董事席位超额控制程度的交互关系对股价崩盘风险的正向影响更明显。最后，控制潜在的内生性问题，并进行一系列的稳健性检验后，研究结论依然成立。本文不仅从关联交易的视角探讨了家族董事席位超额控制对资本市场的影响，也为家族企业股价崩盘风险的成因提供了更多的理论解释。

关键词: 家族企业, 家族董事席位超额控制, 股价崩盘风险, 关联交易

Abstract: As a strengthening mechanism of family control,the excess control of family board seats will give the controlling family a strong incentive to carry out related party transactions,which will affect the stock price crash risk. The samples of family firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares are manually identified from the sub-database of the private listed companies in CSMAR database,and the key data such as the proportion of family shareholding and the number of family directors are collected manually. Other data come from CSMAR database and RESSET database.The sample period is from December 31,2008 to December 31,2017. The degree of excess control of family board seats (ECFBS) is measured by the difference between the proportion of board seats controlled by the family and the proportion of shares held by the family. The related party transaction behavior variables are measured by Tunnel_dum and Tunnel_asset. The stock price crash risk variables are measured by CrashRisk,including two indicators of NCSKEW and DUVOL. Based on the perspective of related party transactions,the relationship between the degree of excess control of family board seats and stock price crash risk is examined. The results show that the degree of excess control of family board seats is positively related to the stock price crash risk and the related party transaction behaviorof the controlling family. The related transaction behavior of the controlling family has a significant positive effect on the stock price crash risk,and this effect is more obvious in companies with higher degree of excess control of family board seats.Further analysis shows that with a lower proportion of institutional shareholding,a combination of two positions and a smaller board size,the degree of excess control of family board seats has a stronger positive correlation with the stock price crash risk and the related party transactionbehavior of the controlling family; the related party transactionbehavior of the controlling family have a more significant positive impact on the stock price crash risk,and its interaction relationship with the degree of excess control of family board seats has a more significant positive impact on the stock price crash risk.Finally,after controlling potential endogenous problems and conducting a series of robustness tests,the conclusion is still valid.

Key words: family firms, excess control of family board seats, stock price crash risk, related party transactions

中图分类号:

F275

刘星, 苏春, 邵欢. 家族董事席位超额控制与股价崩盘风险——基于关联交易的视角[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(5): 1-13.

LIU Xing, SU Chun, SHAO Huan. Excess Control of Family Board Seats and Stock Price Crash Risk——Based on the Perspective of Related Party Transactions[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(5): 1-13.

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