经济利益驱动下食品企业安全风险演化动态研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.12.011

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 消费扩大驱动下食品质量安全问题日渐严峻，食品企业经济利益驱动型掺假所具有的蓄意性、隐蔽性、技术性特点，为新时期食品安全治理提出了一系列挑战。鉴于此，本文借助演化博弈理论，考虑了食品企业收益、食品生产技术成本、生产残次食品损失以及政府监管成本、社会负面效益等因素对食品安全风险形成的影响，构建了食品掺假行为演化博弈模型，并对其演化状态进行了理论和仿真分析。在此基础上，运用元胞自动机理论，进一步考虑到食品企业策略转变意愿与基层食品监管机构策略转变意愿，从空间博弈角度对食品掺假行为及其监管的空间演化状态进行了深度剖析和刻画。研究结果显示，食品企业和基层食品监管机构在策略选择方面具有同步性振荡特征。而且，在食品企业策略转变意愿或基层食品监管机构策略转变意愿维持较低水平时，食品企业和基层食品监管机构的策略（严格监管，合规生产）是纯策略稳定状态。通过本文研究既丰富了我国食品安全监管理论，也为地方食品安全长效监管提供了思路借鉴和理论指导。

关键词: 经济利益驱动, 食品安全, 元胞自动机, 演化博弈, 空间动态

Abstract: In recent years, with the expansion of people's consumption scale, the issue of food safety has increasingly become the focus of scholars. As the Economically Motivated Adulteration (EMA) has the characteristics of deliberate, hidden and technical, it has put forward a series of challenges for food safety management in the new era. In this article, to solve the regulatory dilemma shown in the replicator dynamics equation, the spatial model of food regulatory agencies and food enterprises is constructed based on the cellular automata. The results show that, the food enterprises and the grassroots food regulatory agencies have the characteristics of synchronous shock in the selection of strategies. Moreover, when the strategic change intention of food enterprises or the strategic change intention of grassroots food regulatory agencies remains at a low level, the strategies of food enterprises and grassroots food regulatory agencies achieve long-term stability, and its stable state is (strict supervision, compliance production). Finally, based on the perspective of government regulation, the countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to ensure long-term supervision of regional food safety. This paper's results not only enrich the theory of food safety supervision in China, but also provid ideas and theoretical guidance for long-term local food safety supervision.

Key words: economic interest drive, food safety, cellular automata, evolutionary game, space dynamic

中图分类号:

F224
O225

王冀宁, 张宇昊, 王雨桐, 陈庭强. 经济利益驱动下食品企业安全风险演化动态研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(12): 113-126.

WANG Ji-ning, ZHANG Yu-hao, WANG Yu-tong, CHEN Ting-qiang. Evolutionary Dynamics of Food Safety Riskby Driven of Economic Interests[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(12): 113-126.

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