基于不公平厌恶或地位追求的创新顾客最优合同类型研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.11.020

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文首先从创新顾客的公平偏好程度、薪酬合同类型（最优激励系数）与激励机制效果的关系入手，引入公平偏好理论（不公平厌恶和地位追求）、相对绩效评估（RPE）和参与成本要素，构建顾客参与企业新产品开发的激励模型；其次，通过模型求解和分析，探讨分析各类薪酬合同中风险成本、不公平预期损失和激励效果之间的关系；最后，通过仿真实验验证并确定企业采用的创新顾客最优薪酬合同类型。研究发现：在同一薪酬合同下，创新顾客愈不在意其参与成本的投入，该合同的激励效果愈积极；关于创新顾客最优合同类型的选择，意味着求解一个三方面权衡，包括风险成本、不公平预期损失和公平偏好的激励效果；对于公平偏好程度较低的创新顾客，企业可采用相对绩效合同，例如锦标竞争合同；对于公平偏好程度较高的创新顾客，当其风险规避程度较高时，可采用团队报酬合同，当其风险规避程度较低时，可采用完美团队合同。

关键词: 不公平厌恶, 地位追求, 创新顾客, 激励系数, 合同类型

Abstract: In today's rapidly changing and highly competitive business environment, it becomes more and more important for firms promoting product and service by gaining and using external knowledge from customers. The customers' participation in product and service innovation is increasingly emphasized both in theory and practice. Therefore, it is necessary to highlight the perception of equity in customer participation (CP) process and develop incentive measures specifically applied to this special group.However, most of the existing literatures research CP incentive measures in equilibrium condition where the degree of jealous equity preference is equal to the degree of sympathetic equity preference. In order to get close to reality, we should further consider the general situation andintroduce both inequity aversion theory and status seeking theory into this paper.
Based on the above discussion, an incentive model of customer participation is built based on equity preference theory (inequity aversion and status seeking), relative performance evaluation and participation cost element from the perspective of innovative customers' participation in team innovation activities. First of all, the effect of the equity preference, incentive intensity and participation cost element on the incentive effect in all kinds of compensation contracts (independent compensation contract, relative performance contract, team compensation contract and perfect team compensation contract) is explored through the model solution and analysis. Secondly, the functional relationship among the risk cost, expected loss from inequity and incentive effect, and obtains the range of optimal incentive intensity andoptimal contract types for innovative customers is discovered. Thirdly, to examine the proposed models, the survey data of 265 users involved in a large software frim's product enhancement project in Guangzhou from March 1st to August 31st in 2017 are collected, which are adopted to carry on the analysis by using Mathematica. Finally, the corresponding management recommendations are put forward according to the research findings.
The results show that:(1) Under the same compensation contract, if innovative customers pay more attention to the input of their effort costs, the more negative effect of the contract will be caused. (2) For innovative customers with a low degree of equity preference, frims can adopt relative performance contracts, such as competitive contracts; (3) For innovative customers with a high degree of equity preference, when their risk aversion degree is high, team compensation contracts can be adopted, and perfect team compensation contract can be adopted when their risk aversion degree is low.
The main innovation points of this paper include-firstly, introduce both inequity aversion and status seeking into the design of CP incentives mechanism can not only further research the influence of equity preference on the optimal contract type of innovative customers and deepen the cognition of innovative customer incentive mechanism theoretically, but also provide the theoretical guidance which has more extensively applicable scope for firms to optimize innovative customer management.Secondly, it can further describe the influence of the participation cost of innovative customers on the incentive mechanism and enrich the connotation of innovative customer incentive theory that consider the actual situation of CP and introduce participation cost element into the model.

Key words: inequity aversion, status seeking, innovative customer, incentive intensity, contract type

中图分类号:

F272

张德鹏, 张凤华. 基于不公平厌恶或地位追求的创新顾客最优合同类型研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(11): 200-210.

ZHANG De-peng, ZHANG Feng-hua. A Research of the Optimal Contract Types of Innovative Customers Based on Inequity Aversion or Status Seeking[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(11): 200-210.

参考文献

[1] Prahalad C K, Ramaswamy V. Co-opting customer competence[J]. Harvard Business Review, 2000, 78(1):79-87.
[2] 刘健, 赵洪款, 刘思峰. 基于顾客不公平规避的服务定价研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2018, 26(2):46-53.
[3] 陈志松, 方莉. 线上线下融合模式下考虑战略顾客行为的供应链协调研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2018, 26(2):14-24.
[4] Nambisan S, Baron B A. Different roles, different strokes:Organizing virtual customer environments to promote two types of customer contributions[J]. Organization Science, 2010, 21(2):554-572.
[5] Landoni P, Dell'Era C, Ferraloro G, et al. Design contribution to the competitive performance of SMEs:The role of design innovation capabilities[J]. Creativity and Innovation Management, 2016, 25(4):484-499.
[6] 张德鹏, 张凤华. 创新顾客的最优合同类型——基于公平偏好理论[J]. 经济管理, 2018, 40(3):93-108.
[7] Inbar O, Tractinsky N. Lowering the line of visibility:incidental users in service encounters[J]. Behaviour and Information Technology, 2012, 31(3):245-260.
[8] Von Hippel E. The source of innovation[M]. New York:Oxford University Press, 1988.
[9] 王永贵. 顾客创新论——全球竞争环境下"价值共创"之道[M]. 北京:中国经济出版社, 2010.
[10] Silpakit P, Fisk R P. Participatizing the service encounter:A theoretical framework[C].Proceedings of American Marketing Association, Chicago, America, 1985.
[11] Zhang Depeng, Yang Chenhui, Zhang Fenghua. Analysis of the equity preference influence in customer participation[J]. Economic Modelling, 2014, 41:1-8.
[12] Hu T S. Developments in interactive relationships and knowledge between KIBS firms and their clients in Taiwan[J].Knowledge Management Research & Practice, 2017, 15(2):257-271.
[13] Bendapudi N, Leone R P. Psychological implications of customer participation in co-production[J]. Journal of Marketing, 2003, 67(1):14-28.
[14] Lovelock C H, Young R. Look to consumers to increase productivity[J]. Harvard Business Review, 1979, 57:168-178.
[15] 张德鹏, 杨晨晖, 张凤华. 基于公平偏好的顾客参与多任务激励机制设计[J]. 经济管理, 2013, 35(12):140-149.
[16] Carr C L. The fairserv model:Consumer reactions to services based on a multidimensional evaluation of service[J]. Decision Sciences, 2007, 38(1):107-130.
[17] 张德鹏, 杨晨晖. 顾客参与创新的团队协作激励机制——基于互惠动机公平模型的研究[J]. 经济管理, 2014, 36(10):147-156.
[18] Von Siemens F. Fairness, adverse selection and employment contracts[D]. Munich:University of Munich, 2005.
[19] 袁茂, 雷勇, 蒲勇健. 基于公平偏好理论的激励机制与代理成本分析[J]. 管理工程学报, 2011, 25(2):82-86.
[20] Brunner M, Sandner K J. Social comparison, group composition, and incentive provision[J]. International Journal of Game Theory, 2012, 41(3):565-602.
[21] 张德鹏, 杨晨晖. 动静态博弈下创新顾客决策行为研究:基于公平偏好视角[J]. 系统工程, 2014, 32(7):56-62.
[22] Fehr E, Schmidt K M. A Theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999, 114(3):817-868.
[23] Bolton G, Ockenfels A. ERC:A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition[J]. American Economic Review, 2000, 90:166-193.
[24] Frank R. Choosing the right pond:Human behavior and the quest for status[M]. New York:Oxford University Press, 1985.
[25] Loewenstein G, Thompson L, Bazerman M H. Social utility and decision making in interpersonal contexts[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1989, 57(3):426-441.
[26] Itoh H. Moral Hazard and Other-regarding Preferences[J]. Japanese Economic Review, 2004, 55(1):18-45.
[27] Demougin D, Fluet C. Group vs. individual performance pay when workers are envious[M]//Demougin D, Schade C.Contributions to entrpereneurship and economics. Berlin:Duncker and Humblot, 2006.
[28] Demougin D, Fluet C, Helm C. Output and wages with inequity averse agents[J]. Canadian Journal of Economics, 2006, 39(2):399-413.
[29] Neilson W S, Stowe J. Piece-rate contracts for other-regarding workers[J]. Economic Inquiry, 2010, 48(3):575-586.
[30] Goel A M, Thakor A V. Optimal contracts when agents envy each other[R]. Discussion Paper, DePaul University, 2006.
[31] Bartling B, von Siemens F. The intensity of incentives in firms and markets:moral hazard with envious agents[J]. Labour Economics, 2010, 17(2):598-607.
[32] Grossman S, Hart O. An analysis of the principal-agent problem[J]. Econometrica, 1983, 51(1):7-45.
[33] Mirrlees J A. An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1971, 38(114):334-368.
[34] Arrow K. Essays in the theory of risk bearing[M]. Chicago:Markham Publishing Co., 1971.