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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (2): 38-47.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0773

• 论文 • 上一篇    

碳市场中市场势力对减排技术采用的影响

曾炳昕1, 丁庆国2, 朱磊2   

  1. 1.国网能源研究院有限公司，北京102209； 2.北京航空航天大学经济管理学院，北京100191
  • 收稿日期:2019-05-29 修回日期:2021-04-29 发布日期:2022-03-02
  • 通讯作者: February,2022 E-mail:leizhu@buaa.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    朱磊

The Effect of Market Power in Carbon Market on Emission Abatement Technology Adoption

ZENG Bing-xin1, DING Qing-guo2, ZHU Lei2   

  1. 1. State Grid Energy Research Institute Co., Ltd, Beijing 102209, China;2. School of Economics and Management, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China
  • Received:2019-05-29 Revised:2021-04-29 Published:2022-03-02
  • Contact: 朱磊(1983-)，男(汉族)，安徽合肥人，北京航空航天大学经济管理学院,教授，博士生导师，研究方向：能源投资评价与低碳政策研究，Email：leizhu@buaa.edu.cn. E-mail:leizhu@buaa.edu.cn
  • Supported by:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71673019，72122002)

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摘要： 碳市场是助力中国实现双碳目标和能源转型的重要市场工具。本文研究了当企业处于不完全竞争的产品市场时，碳市场中的市场势力对低碳减排技术采用与扩散的影响。我们将异质性企业刻画引入Reinganum提出的技术采用模型框架，构建了碳交易背景下的异质性企业策略性技术采用博弈模型。模型中企业需要同时考虑采用新减排技术的效益和成本，以及其竞争对手的策略性行为，从而确定采用新技术的最佳时间。理论分析与仿真结果表明，有市场势力的情况下，企业都将推迟采用新的低碳减排技术。而且当产品需求与弹性较小时，它将导致更晚的技术扩散。本文研究结论为碳市场推进低碳减排技术扩散的机制设计和优化提供更多的理论参考依据，有力推动中国绿色低碳转型。

关键词: 碳市场；市场势力；技术采用与扩散；策略性行为

Abstract: With China already committing to peak carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060, green low carbon development has become an important theme in the longer term. In this context, the carbon market has become a crucial market-based tool to help achieve China’s climate goals and energy transition. The effect of market power in carbon emission trading market on the diffusion of a new low carbon emissions abatement technology when firms interact in imperfectly competitive output market is investigated. Based on the classical framework proposed by Reinganum, the extension is made by introducing heterogeneous firms to describe firms’ strategic behavior and a two-stage non-cooperative game model is developed. In the first stage, each firm need determine the optimal time to adopt the new emissions abatement technology, taking into account its benefits and costs, as well as its rival’s strategic behavior. The first stage is described as a simultaneous-move game. In the second stage, given the level of abatement technology, each firm makes its own optimal output and emission decisions based on the profit maximization principle. This second stage is described as a leader-follower game. With this framework, through theoretical analysis and numerical simulation, the results suggest that firms will delay to adopt the new emissions abatement technology in the presence of market power in carbon market. Moreover, it will induce much later technology diffusion when the output demand is smaller and less elastic. This implies that the technology diffusion in the weak elastic sector may have more barriers than in the strong elastic sector. More theoretical references are provided for the design and optimization of the carbon market to promote the diffusion of low carbon emission reduction technologies. The policymaker should pay more attention to the market structure of sector covered in the carbon market. Furthermore, the regulator can enhance the supervision for the key firms to cope with the side effects of market power.

Key words: carbon market; market power; technology adoption and diffusion; strategic behavior

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