两阶段供应链碳排放目标减排量分配研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0268

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 由于不同企业减排成本和减排效率有所差异，将目标减排量在供应链企业间进行合理分配是顺利完成减排目标的关键。本文研究了制造商和零售商组成的两阶段供应链的既定目标减排量分配问题，考虑企业减排对产品需求有正向影响，根据制造商分配和零售商分配两种分配方式，以及制造商领导、零售商领导和垂直纳什三种渠道权力结构，构建了六种决策模型，分析分配方式和渠道权力结构对分配决策和供应链成员以及系统利润的影响。研究表明，在三种渠道权利中：由减排对需求影响大的企业进行分配，制造商和零售商会分摊减排量，由减排对需求影响小的企业进行分配，减排量全部由对方企业承担，市场需求更大；作为领导者比作为跟随者承担更多减排量；由减排对需求影响大且减排效率低的企业分配减排量，可以实现减排量在供应链企业间分摊以及系统利润最大化，由减排对需求影响小且减排效率低或略高于对方的企业分配减排量，虽然系统利润最优，但是以单个企业承担全部减排量为代价。

关键词: 可持续运营管理, 目标减排量分配, 斯塔伯格博弈, 逆向归纳法

Abstract: As global warming intensifies, firms as main greenhouse gas emitters are responsible for the energy saving and carbon reduction. Given the fact that there exist great differences among firms in terms of the emission abatement efficiency and cost, and great amounts of carbon emissions are generated outside the firm, it is crucial that carbon emissions are allocated according to the emission abatement characteristics of each firm in the supply chain. Considering the positive impacts of firms' emission abatement behaviors on the market demand, how the given emission abatement target is allocated to the members of a bilateral monopoly supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer is investigated in this paper.
Considering three channel power structures:manufacturer Stackelberg, retailer Stackelberg, and Vertical Nash, and two allocation modes:manufacturer allocating and retailer allocating, the profit maximization functions of the manufacturer and retailer in the six decision models are constructed to illustrate the impacts of channel power structures and allocation modes on the carbon emission abatement target allocation decisions and the channel players' as well as the system's profits of the supply chain. The equilibrium solutions in the six models are solved by applying the backward induction method, and managerial insights are obtained from detailed analyses of the results.
Our research shows that in the three channel power structures:(1) the total abatement target can be divided between the manufacturer and retailer, if the firm, who has a strong influence on the market demand, allocates the abatement target, otherwise, the total abatement target will be assigned to the other firm if allocated by the firm with a small influence on the market demand. Moreover, the manufacturer/retailer acting as a leader in the supply chain will be responsible for more carbon emission reductions than as a follower; (2) the demand is the largest when the emission abatement target is allocated by the firm who has a small impact on the demand, which is achieved at the sacrifice of the other firm's undertaking all the carbon abatement cost and does harm to the firm's motivation on carbon reduction initiatives; (3) the maximum system profit and fair allocation of the abatement target can only be achieved when the firm who has a lower emission abatement efficiency and a stronger influence on the demand distributes the abatement target. The results provide firms with some guidance for how to undertake cooperative carbon emission reductions among firms in the supply chain.

Key words: sustainable operations management, carbon emission abatement target allocation, Stackelberg game, backward induction method

中图分类号:

F224
F205

张维月, 刘晨光, 李琳, 焦金霞. 两阶段供应链碳排放目标减排量分配研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(9): 90-101.

ZHANG Wei-yue, LIU Chen-guang, LI Lin, JIAO Jin-xia. Allocation of the Carbon Emission Abatement Target in A Two-echelon Supply Chain[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(9): 90-101.

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