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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2017, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (11): 103-110.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.11.011

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

不同合作状态下交通特许经营项目特许期决策模型

燕雪1,2, 徐媛1, 盛昭瀚1,2, 王歌3, 徐峰1,2   

  1. 1. 南京大学工程管理学院, 江苏 南京 210093;
    2. 南京大学社会科学计算实验中心, 江苏 南京 210093;
    3. 同济大学经济与管理学院, 上海 200092
  • 收稿日期:2016-06-08 修回日期:2016-12-16 出版日期:2017-11-20 发布日期:2018-01-31
  • 通讯作者: 燕雪(1991-),女(汉族),江苏徐州人,南京大学工程管理学院,博士研究生,研究方向:重大工程投融资决策分析、社会科学计算实验,E-mail:xueyan9103@163.com E-mail:xueyan9103@163.com
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然基金项科学基金重大项目（71390520）；国家自然科学基金面上项目（71471007，71101067，71371094，71671088）；江苏省研究生培养创新工程项目（KYZZ16_0026）

Concession Period Decision Model of the Traffic Franchise Project Under the Different Forms of Cooperation

YAN Xue1,2, XU Yuan1, SHENG Zhao-han1,2, WANG Ge3, XU Feng1,2   

  1. 1. School of Management and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China;
    2. Computational Experiment Center for Social Science, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China
  • Received:2016-06-08 Revised:2016-12-16 Online:2017-11-20 Published:2018-01-31

PDF (PC)

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摘要： 在特许经营项目建设过程中，政府和私营企业之间具有两种不同的合作形式：充分合作和不充分合作。本文分析了不同合作形式下政府和私营企业的决策目标差异，并建立了相应的特许期决策模型。由于不充分合作时双方可能存在一定的利益冲突，因此，本文在特许期决策模型中引入谈判能力参数作为评估一方抗衡另一方侵蚀自己利益的能力，并分析了政府和私营企业的谈判能力对特许期决策的影响，得出以下结论：充分合作状态下，合同双方的谈判能力对特许期决策没有影响，最优特许期为整个项目生命周期；不充分合作状态下，私营企业的谈判能力对收费道路的特许经营期长度及其创造的总社会福利均具有积极影响；此外，当私营企业谈判能力较弱时，其可以通过提高单位运营成本的盈利水平来改善谈判中的弱势地位，延长特许经营期，并获得更多收益。

关键词: 特许经营项目, 谈判能力, 特许期, 不充分合作

Abstract: In the process of the franchise project construction, there are two different forms of cooperation between the government and the private:the full cooperation and the non-full cooperation. Under the full cooperation, the government and the private sector are integrated into a whole body to jointly build projects, and the government shares profits and risks with the private sector. Under the non-full cooperation, the private undertakes the job of investment, financing, construction and management of the project, while the government only has the right to supervise the project, and they do not have its management right. This leads to the differences on the decision objects of the two forms of cooperation. Under the full cooperation, the government and the private have the same goal, namely maximizing the total social welfare of the toll road throughout its life cycle. Hence, a single objective concession period decision model is established. However, under the non-full cooperation, the government only focuses on the social welfare of the project during the transfer period, while the private only focuses on the economic benefits during the franchising period. Based on these, a bi-objective concession period decision making model is built to maximize the private's and the government's benefits. In this paper, there may be some conflicts of interest between the two sides, so the negotiation power is introduced to assess the ability of one side against the other side eroding its benefits. Then, the influence of the private's negotiation power on concession period decision is analyzed. The conclusions are:under the full cooperation, the negotiation power has no influence on the concession period decision, and the concession period is the entire project life; under the non-full cooperation, the private's negotiation power has a positive impact on the length of concession road and the total social welfare which is created by the toll road. Furthermore, when the private's negotiation power is weak, it can prove the bargaining position by raising the profit level of the unit operation cost to extend the concession period, and to gain more benefits.

Key words: franchise project, negotiation power, concession period, non-full cooperation

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