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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2015, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (8): 168-176.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.08.019

• 论文 • 上一篇    

基于演化博弈和优化理论的环境污染群体性事件处置机制

郑君君1, 闫龙1, 张好雨2, 何鸿勇1   

  1. 1. 武汉大学经济与管理学院, 湖北 武汉 430072;
    2. 浙江大学管理学院, 浙江 杭州 310058
  • 收稿日期:2014-08-01 修回日期:2014-12-30 出版日期:2015-08-20 发布日期:2015-08-19
  • 作者简介:郑君君(1966-),女(汉族),湖北松滋人,武汉大学经济与管理学院,教授,博导,研究方向:博弈论与机制设计.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金项目(71371147)

Disposal Mechanism of Environmental PollutionMass Incidents Based on Evolutionary Game and Optimization Theory

ZHENG Jun-jun1, YAN Long1, ZHANG Hao-yu2, HE Hong-yong1   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, China;
    2. School of Management, Zhejiang University, Zhejiang 310058, China
  • Received:2014-08-01 Revised:2014-12-30 Online:2015-08-20 Published:2015-08-19

PDF (PC)

2122

被引次数

27

摘要： 通过对环境污染群体性事件进行研究,以探寻环境污染群体性事件产生的原因并解决环境污染群体性事件引发的问题。首先,运用演化博弈理论研究环境污染引发群体性事件的博弈过程及相关的利益冲突,并考虑当群体间存在信息交互时,监管部门采用舆情引导的情况下环境污染群体性事件的演化特征。其次,运用优化理论探讨了监管部门从长远的角度考虑整体利益时应如何解决环境污染事件。研究表明监管部门加强舆情引导、避免发布错误信号、提高其公信力均有助于环境污染事件冲突的规避和解决;对于污染的治理问题则可以合理采用实物保护和警告处罚等方式。本文在综合考虑长远影响和整体利益的情况下,考虑信息交互并引入舆情引导,运用演化博弈和优化理论探讨监管部门应如何有效地处置环境污染群体事件这一问题。

关键词: 演化博弈, 环境污染, 群体性事件, 处置机制, 舆情引导, 优化理论

Abstract: Environmental pollution events are researched to explore the causes of environmental pollution incidents and solve the problem derived from environmental pollution events. First,the environmental pollution incidents and relevant conflicts of interest are studied by using evolutionary game theory. And when there exists information interaction among groups and public opinion guidance from supervision department, the evolution characteristics of environmental pollution even are displayed. Second, by using optimization theory, the solution of how to disposal the environmental pollution is discussed when considering the overall interests in the long run. It shows that strengthening public opinion guidance, avoiding the error signal and improving the regulatory credibility help to evade and settle conflicts caused by environmental pollution events. Physical protection and warning and punishment can be adopted to solve the environmental problem. In the case of considering long-term effects and the overall interests, this paper introduces the information interaction and public opinion guidance and combines evolutionary game theory and optimization theory are introduced to explore how to effectively dispose environmental pollution mass incidents.

Key words: evolutionary game theory, environmental pollution, mass incidents, disposal mechanism, public opinion guidance, optimization theory

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