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Articles

Incentives and Coordination of Fresh Investment of Fresh Agricultural Products Supply Chain

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  • 1. School of Business Administration of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, China;
    2. Business School of Ningbo University, Ningbo 315211, China

Received date: 2017-04-23

  Revised date: 2017-09-25

  Online published: 2019-06-12

Abstract

Two phases supply chain of fresh agricultural products of two-stage discount pricing under "cooperative + core enterprise" mode is established in this paper. Based on the influence of consumer fresh preferences and price preferences on market demand, Nash bargaining solution is selected as a fair reference and fairness preference theory of cooperative is introduced to study the fresh investment decision of members in supply chain. For the incentives of cooperative in fresh efforts, the impact the preference of supply chain members makeing on fresh effort level and the incentive and coordinative effect of revenue sharing contract are explored. It is found that the increase of consumer's preference about freshness can promote the incentive effect of revenue sharing contract, and improve the fair utility of cooperatives. Meanwhile, the incentive effect of revenue-sharing contract produces to fresh effort in the first phase is better than that in the second, and the combination of revenue sharing and cost allocation can significantly improve fresh investment of the second phase.

Cite this article

XIONG Feng, FANG Jian-yu, YUAN Jun, JIN Peng . Incentives and Coordination of Fresh Investment of Fresh Agricultural Products Supply Chain[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019 , 27(4) : 115 -126 . DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.04.011

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