Abstract:

A green product supply chain consisting of manufacturers and sellers is proposed， which includes four types of green supply chain models： manufacturers promoting green innovation with fair preference （MM）， sellers promoting green innovation with fair preference （RM）， manufacturers promoting green innovation with fair preference （MR）， and sellers promoting green innovation with fair preference （RR）. Applying game theory methods to solve， the results indicate that： （1） In both types of green supply chain models， namely， the manufacturer-driven green innovation with manufacturer's fairness preference and the retailer-driven green innovation with manufacturer's fairness preference， the efforts of green innovation， product demand， manufacturer's profit， retailer's profit， system total profit， manufacturer's utility， and retailer's utility are all negatively correlated with the degree of manufacturer's preference. （2） The product demand， manufacturer's profit， retailer's profit， system total profit， manufacturer's utility， and retailer's utility under the retailer-driven green innovation with manufacturer's fairness preference strategy are higher than those under the manufacturer-driven green innovation with manufacturer's fairness preference strategy. （3） In the manufacturer-driven green innovation with retailer's fairness preference strategy， when the degree of retailer's fairness preference is controlled within a reasonable range， it helps to enhance the retailer's profit. The retailer's green innovation efforts， product demand， and system total profit are not related to retailer's fairness preference. （4） The product demand， manufacturer's profit， retailer's profit， system total profit， manufacturer's utility， and retailer's utility under the retailer-driven green innovation with retailer's fairness preference strategy are higher than those under the manufacturer-driven green innovation with retailer's fairness preference strategy. Based on the above conclusions， it is recommended for the retailer to implement green innovation strategies， regardless of whether the manufacturer has fairness preference or the retailer has fairness preference. （5） Among the four strategies， the retailer-driven green innovation with retailer's fairness preference strategy is the best choice. The product demand， retailer's profit， and system total profit are optimal under this strategy. When the retailer's preference meets certain conditions， the manufacturer's profit is also optimal under the retailer-driven green innovation with retailer's fairness preference strategy. It is recommended that the government encourage retailers to promote green products with fairness preference. Retailers can make specific green innovation efforts such as green promotion and green advertising. This not only has profound significance for the development of the green economy and the construction of a resource-saving society but also plays an important role in the healthy development and safety of the green industry.

Key words: fair preference, green innovation, green supply chain