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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (8): 115-126.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.1260

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Capacity Replenishment Channel Selection and Pricing Decisions Considering the Operational Modes of the Platform

Wei Xiao1,2, Kai Li2(), Rui Xu1   

  1. 1.Business School,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China
    2.School of Management,Hefei University of Technology,Hefei 230009,China
  • Received:2023-07-26 Revised:2025-08-28 Online:2026-08-25 Published:2026-07-14
  • Contact: Kai Li E-mail:hfutlk@163.com

Abstract:

Capacity sharing in the manufacturing industry provides a novel way to overcome capacity bottlenecks. To address uncertainties in market demand, capacity cooperation agreements are usually reached between manufacturers and backup capacity suppliers. The manufacturer’s dual-channel capacity supplement strategy and the platform’s capacity pricing strategy are investigated in this paper under both the bilateral pricing model and the fixed commission rate model by establishing a platform-leader Stackelberg game model. Using the standard backward induction, it is shown that, compared to the fixed commission rate model, the manufacturer faces a higher threshold for reserving capacity from backup suppliers and relies heavily on platform capacity supply in the bilateral pricing model. In addition, the commission rate, capacity sharing price, and supply price are higher, as well as the platform’s profit. Furthermore, the impacts of the capacity reservation contract on the manufacturer's decisions and each supply chain player’s profit are discussed through numerical analysis. Consequently, some valuable insights into the design of capacity-sharing platforms and the selection of optimal business models are provided.

Key words: sharing economy, platform operation, capacity sharing, capacity reservation contract

CLC Number: