Abstract:

The lack of an effective reputation mechanism for online lending platforms makes it difficult for investors to distinguish between high-risk and low-risk platforms in online lending effectively. In theory， the reputation mechanism can be fulfilled through signaling mechanisms， yet does the fund depository service provided by commercial banks help lending platforms to formulate an effective reputation mechanism？ Can such a reputation mechanism alleviate information asymmetry and contribute to the development of the online lending industry？ The research perspective is extended from the personal reputation of investors to the reputation of online lending platforms and a tripartite game model including platforms， commercial banks， and investors is constructed to understand the role of reputation signals in the dynamic evolution of the game among the three parties. The core findings include： according to the static equilibrium model， the certification of platforms by commercial banks helps to form a reputation mechanism with positive feedback， and increasing the proportion of actively certified banks helps to promote self-regulation of platforms， which ultimately increases investors' returns. The evolutionary game model indicates that the key to forming a stable separation equilibrium lies in the capability of banks to play a strict screening role. The dynamic reputation mechanism affirms that increasing banks' reputation costs or raising banks' certification fees for platforms helps to improve the probability of commercial banks choosing the “active certification” behavioral strategy to achieve the separation equilibrium. A series of regression results based on the survival model suggests that access to bank depository services improves the survival rate of platforms. However， limited by the low proportion of actively certified banks and the majority as small and medium-sized commercial banks， the third-party certification role of banks is directly inhibited， and the screening role of reputation signals is impeded， which offers a new research perspective to understand the role of reputation mechanism in Internet finance.

Key words: peer-to-peer lending platform, tripartite game model, reputation effect, dynamic evolutionary game