Abstract:

Chinese certification emission reductions （CCER） is a fundamental element of carbon trading system and is regarded as a key path to compensate for the positive externality of renewable energy projects and promote green development of energy industry. To complete project development， certified emission reduction enterprises usually need to cooperate with carbon asset management companies. Common CCER project cooperation models include pure consultancy， revenue and risk sharing， and centralized decision-making. Under the background of the restart of CCER market， when selecting cooperation models for CCER project development， enterprises need to comprehensively consider various factors， such as revenue， risk， project clean development level， and environmental impact. Therefore， it is necessary to analyze from multiple perspectives which cooperation model certified emission reduction enterprises should choose for CCER project development. In addition， to achieve a centralized decision-making level， appropriate contracts need to be designed to coordinate the benefits of both parties， reduce project risks， and motivate certified emission reduction enterprises to carry out clean development of CCER projects.To explore the impact of different development models of CCER projects on enterprise decisions from a risk perspective， a game model is constructed based on three CCER cooperation models， consisting of a third-party carbon asset management company and certified emission reduction enterprises. The different cooperation models are compared in terms of unit product price， project development scale， profit， clean development level， and environmental impact， providing decision-making basis for the optimal project cooperation model for carbon asset management enterprises and certified emission reduction enterprises. In addition， to address the issue of marginal efficiency loss in decentralized decision-making， optimal clean development level coordination contract and optimal revenue sharing ratio coordination contract are designed to achieve supply chain coordination.Through the study， it is found that when the risk of project development failure falls within a certain threshold range， the carbon asset management company participating in the revenue and risk sharing model will share more profits. Moreover， when the risk of project development failure exceeds a certain threshold， the revenue and risk sharing model can effectively expand the project development scale and promote environmental improvement. However， when the environmental benefits of the project are significant， the revenue and risk sharing model is not always beneficial for the profit of certified emission reduction enterprises and leads to lower levels of clean development. By designing optimal clean development level coordination contracts and optimal revenue sharing ratio coordination contracts， certified emission reduction enterprises can be encouraged to develop CCER projects based on centralized transaction prices， project scales， and clean development levels， thereby achieving supply chain coordination. Therefore， when signing the revenue and risk sharing cooperation agreement， both parties should focus on negotiating and coordinating the optimal project revenue sharing ratio.In addition， the project price sensitivity coefficient is also an important factor affecting the cooperation between third-party carbon asset management companies and certified emission reduction enterprises. As the price sensitivity coefficient increases， the space for coordinated profits becomes larger. In the face of a market with limited elasticity， certified emission reduction enterprises should cautiously develop and adopt a prudent development strategy. The government should ensure that the inclusion of CCER plays a driving role in the carbon market while ensuring that offset mechanisms have a certain degree of flexibility.

Key words: carbon offset mechanism, CCER project development, risk-sharing, coordination mechanism