平台经济监管规范与促进发展并重政策的作用研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.0959

Abstract

Abstract:

With the prosperity and development of the platform economy， problems such as online counterfeit sales， false information and piracy and infringement occur frequently on the platform. The government attach great importance to the problem of platform economic governance in our country， and have introduced a number of policy documents in order to balance the two important goals of “regulation” and “development”. As for platform economic governance issues， the focus of current academic studies is mostly focused on the emphasis on the implementation of a relatively strict and strong supervision mode for platform economy， and few scholars include “development” and “norms” into the research scope of governance strategy formulation， which makes it difficult for platform economic governance strategies to achieve in-depth promotion， moderate advance and orderly implementation. It failed to effectively promote the healthy and sustainable development of Chinese platform economy. Therefore， it has become a key topic to explore the role of both regulatory norms and development promotion policies in platform economic governance， as well as effective measures to give full play to the role of both policies. In this paper， evolutionary game theory and Markov chain method are comprehensively applied. Based on the stochastic characteristics of the state evolution of the platform economic governance game system， Markov transition probability matrix under the effect of equal emphasis policy is constructed. MATLAB is used to simulate the probability change trend of the system state after n-stage iteration， and the role of equal emphasis policy on the platform economic governance is explored. Then， according to the modified strategy of emphasizing the role of the policy， the correlation analysis of key parameters with Maple is carried out， and the countermeasures are proposed by comprehensively considering the conditions affecting the play of the role. The findings are as follows： the implementation of equal emphasis policy has a positive effect on platform economic governance， but at the same time， there is a risk of increasing the probability of illegal operation of merchants. Strict supervision by the government or active review by the platform to guide merchants to operate in compliance is an effective correction strategy to give full play to the role of both policies， and the correction effect is the best when both the government and the platform fulfill their duties. Keeping the efficiency of information transfer between the government and the platform and the probability of public reporting at a high level is an important direction for deepening the application of the policy of equal importance in the future. It provides a new perspective and method of analysis for future scholars to better explore the issues of platform economic governance in this study.

Key words: platform economy, evolutionary game, markov, regulatory norms, promote the development

CLC Number:

F224.32

Hongyang He,Bin Zhang,Sujun Tian. Research on the Role of Regulation and Development Policy of Platform Economy：Model Introduction, Theoretical Analysis and Countermeasure Suggestions[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(11): 1-12.

Figures/Tables 16

参数	含义
$C$	政府严格监管时需付出的成本，由固定与边际两部分成本组成
$c$	政府严格监管时需付出的固定成本
$k$	政府自身监管能力， $0 ≤ k ≤ 1$
$I$	政府自身掌握的市场信息水平， $0 ≤ I ≤ 1$
$s$	政府开展监管活动所带来的公信力提升
$μ$	政府查处违规商家的概率，受政府自身与公众举报的综合影响
$u$	政府自身查处违规商家的概率， $0 ≤ u ≤ 1$
$p$	公众向政府与平台举报商家违规的概率， $0 ≤ p ≤ 1$
$f$	政府给平台分配的权力空间， $0 ≤ f ≤ 1$
$i$	平台自身掌握的市场信息水平， $0 ≤ i ≤ 1$
$e$	政府与平台之间的信息传递效率， $0 ≤ e ≤ 1$
$B$	平台积极审查时需付出的成本，由固定与边际两部分成本组成
$b$	平台积极审查时需付出的固定成本
$g$	平台开展审查活动所带来的声誉提升
$π$	平台消极审查时查处违规商家的概率，受政府与公众的综合影响
$d$	商家选择合规经营时获得的收益
$m$	商家合规经营带来的社会总福利提升
$r$	商家合规经营给平台带来的收益
$Δ d$	商家选择违规经营时获得的额外收益
$v$	商家违规经营造成的社会总福利损失
$φ$	商家违规经营给平台造成的用户流失损失
$ψ$	商家违规被政府查处时遭受的罚金
$h$	商家违规被政府查处时，平台遭受的连带处罚
$w$	商家违规被政府查处时，平台消极审查遭受的政府罚金
$τ$	商家违规被平台查处时遭受的损失
$δ$	商家违规经营被政府处罚后遭受的声誉损失
$j$	商家违规经营被政府处罚后给平台带来的声誉损失

博弈方				平台
博弈方				积极审查 $y$	消极审查 $1 - y$
政府	严格监管 $x$	商家	合规经营 $z$	$s - c - [1 - I - e i (1 - I)] / k + m$	$s - c - (1 - I) / k + m$
				$g - b - (1 - i) / f + r$	$r$
				$d$	$d$
			违规经营 $1 - z$	$s - c - [1 - I - e i (1 - I)] / k - v$	$s - c - (1 - I) / k - v$
				$g - b - (1 - i) / f - φ - [u + p (1 - u)] (h + j)$	$- φ - [u + p (1 - u)] (h + w + j)$
				$d + Δ d - [u + p (1 - u)] (ψ + δ) - τ$	$d + Δ d - [u + p (1 - u)] (ψ + δ) - [u + p (1 - u) (2 - p)] τ$
	放松监管 $1 - x$	商家	合规经营 $z$	$m$	$m$
				$g - b - (1 - i) / f + r$	$r$
				$d$	$d$
			违规经营 $1 - z$	$- v$	$- v$
				$g - b - (1 - i) / f - φ - p (h + j)$	$- φ - p (h + w + j)$
				$d + Δ d - p (ψ + δ) - τ$	$d + Δ d - p (ψ + δ) - p (2 - p) τ$

初始状态	概率
$S G 1, S P 1, S M 1$	$x y z$
$S G 1, S P 1, S M 2$	$x y 1 - z$
$S G 1, S P 2, S M 1$	$x 1 - y z$
$S G 1, S P 2, S M 2$	$x 1 - y 1 - z$
$S G 2, S P 1, S M 1$	$1 - x y z$
$S G 2, S P 1, S M 2$	$1 - x y 1 - z$
$S G 2, S P 2, S M 1$	$1 - x 1 - y z$
$S G 2, S P 2, S M 2$	$1 - x 1 - y 1 - z$

参数	$c$	$k$	$e$	$I$	$f$	$i$	$p$	$b$
作用	阻碍	促进	促进	促进	促进	促进	不定	阻碍

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Research on the Role of Regulation and Development Policy of Platform Economy：Model Introduction, Theoretical Analysis and Countermeasure Suggestions

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