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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (9): 153-163.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.1504

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Transportation Strategies Considering the Service Uncertainty of Online Freight Platforms

Chenchen Yang1, Xiaolong Guo2, Yangguang Zhu1(), Wenwen Jiang2   

  1. 1.School of Economics,Hefei University of Technology,Hefei 230601 China
    2.School of Management,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China
  • Received:2024-09-02 Revised:2025-04-08 Online:2026-09-25 Published:2026-09-01
  • Contact: Yangguang Zhu E-mail:yanggzhu@mail.ustc.edu.cn

Abstract:

The emergence of Online Freight Platforms (OFPs) has revolutionized the road freight industry by aggregating fragmented social transportation capacity, enhancing market efficiency, and promoting intensive resource utilization. However, the inherent service uncertainty of OFPs, stemming from their limited control over independent drivers, poses a critical challenge to their ability to serve high-value logistics segments. A game-theoretic model incorporating a risk-averse shipper, an OFP, and a Traditional Logistics Service Provider (TLSP) is developed to investigate the service commitment and pricing strategies of OFPs under service uncertainty. The analysis yields several counterintuitive yet insightful findings. First, while OFPs are inclined to offer service level commitments to highly risk-averse shippers to assure stability, the promised service level under commitment is actually lower than the average level provided without commitment. This paradoxical result arises from the transfer of risk responsibility: when bearing the risk themselves, OFPs are motivated to reduce costly efforts and optimize their cost structure, leading to a stable but lower service output. Second, a service commitment alone is not a sufficient condition for shippers to choose an OFP. Shippers will only opt for an OFP over a TLSP if the former possesses a significant cost advantage (i.e., a lower cost factor for service effort). Furthermore, by characterizing the strategic equilibrium under varying degrees of risk aversion and cost configurations, it is identified that the conjunction of low-cost advantage and high-risk aversion constitutes the critical condition under which an OFP should offer service commitment to secure the shipper’s cooperation. Substantial theoretical contributions are made by unveiling the intricate strategic interactions among participants in the digital freight ecosystem. It provides a novel theoretical explanation for the operational mechanisms of OFPs, particularly the effort adjustment and risk-transfer incentives behind service commitment. Moreover, it offers practical managerial implications for OFPs in designing their service and pricing strategies and guides shippers in making informed outsourcing decisions in the presence of service uncertainty.

Key words: online freight platform, logistics service level, service effort, transportation service outsourcing, supply chain pricing

CLC Number: