Abstract:

To win the competition， all major online video platforms are now increasing the number of their exclusive video for differentiation. However， this action will directly change the original competition logic between the platforms by generating multi-homing viewers. Simply deciding the number of exclusive rights from the perspective of competitive differentiation is unwise. Combining the “positive and negative cross network externalities” of streaming media platforms， the dynamic game theory is applied to give the optimal exclusive content procuring decision of such platforms under different clients' multi-homing scenarios. The optimal exclusive rights ratio decisions of platforms under different market homing scenarios and specifies three sets of environmental factors that platforms should focus on in their decisions are given. In particular， the platform's two-sided pricing and exclusive rights procurement cost directly affect the platform's decision， while the homing of the two-sided market exerts an indirect influence on the exclusive rights ratio by affecting the platform's pricing decision. Subsequently， by comparing the equilibrium results of different scenarios， the complex impact of multi-homing behavior of two-sided clients on platforms' exclusive rights decisions and competitive strategies is further explored. Viewers' multi-homing behavior can cause competitively weak platforms to “free-rider” when making exclusive rights decisions. However， if advertisers also engage in multi-homing behavior， the interaction between multi-homing viewers and advertisers can lead competing platforms to jointly increase exclusivity ratios in some cases in order to increase market size. At this point， a cooperative relationship exists between competing platforms. Finally， the impact of multi-homing behavior of two-sided clients on platform profits is analyzed. This impact is reflected in the fact that the multi-homing behavior of different clients in video platforms changes the scope and direction of the impact of exclusive rights on platform profits. Existing studies related to the competition for exclusive rights in video platforms mainly focus on the impact of viewers' multi-homing behavior on platforms' competition in the content market， and few studies focus on the impact of viewers' multi-homing behavior on platforms' competition in the advertising market. Even fewer studies have focused on the impact of viewers' and advertisers' multi-homing behavior on competition in the two-sided market， and have considered the interaction between the two types of multi-homing clients in video platforms' exclusive rights decisions. The ratio of exclusive rights of platforms in competitive markets is analyzed by integrating the multi-homing behaviors of viewers and advertisers， which is of theoretical value. From a practical point of view， most of the current video platforms are obsessed with pursuing a high percentage of exclusive rights as a means to differentiate themselves from the competition. The irrationality of this approach is proved. Due to the existence of multi-homing viewers and multi-homing advertisers， a high percentage of exclusive rights does not necessarily bring a competitive advantage to platforms， but instead leads to heavy cost burdens.

Key words: two-sided platform, cross network externalities, multi-homing consumer, exclusive content, free-riding