中小股东网络表达对企业金融化的影响

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.2215

Abstract

Abstract:

With the continuous maturation of capital markets， financialization has become a significant characteristic of modern corporate operations. The widespread use of the internet and social media has increasingly highlighted the role of small and medium-sized shareholders' online expressions in corporate financialization. As the volume of online posts by these shareholders increases， investor sentiment is transmitted to company management through online expressions， thereby exerting pressure on the management from small and medium-sized shareholders. Although the increase in financial asset investments is accompanied by higher risks， it can effectively enhance the short-term excess returns of enterprises. The pressure from small and medium-sized shareholders makes the management more inclined to allocate financial assets， thereby exacerbating corporate financialization.

To verify the above hypothesis， non-financial firms listed on the A-share market from 2008 to 2022 are used as samples and empirically examines the impact of small and medium-sized shareholders' online expressions on corporate financialization using posting data from stock forums. Most Chinese companies completed the split-share structure reform at the beginning of 2007， and since 2008， the volume of posts on stock forums has stabilized， gradually highlighting its impact on the stock market. Therefore， the sample of stocks in this paper includes all A-share listed companies， covering the period from 2008 to 2022. Additionally， the online expressions of small and medium-sized shareholders are measured using data on posts， comments， and readings from the Eastmoney stock forum available on the China Research Data Service Platform （CNRDS）. Financial data， executive characteristics， board data， and shareholder holding data are all sourced from the CNRDS database. News data and analyst report data come from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research （CSMAR） database， while market data for the stock market is obtained from the Wind database.

It is found that online expressions convey pressure to corporate management by small and medium-sized shareholders， incentivizing managers to reallocate resources toward financial assets that are more likely to generate short-term excess returns， thereby intensifying the degree of corporate financialization. Furthermore， this positive relationship between online expressions and corporate financialization is more pronounced under greater performance pressure， competitive pressure， and weaker external regulation. The impact of small and medium-sized shareholders' online expressions on corporate financialization is discussed from the perspective of social media's role in corporate governance， which has significant positive implications for the regulation of social media public opinion and the healthy development of corporate financialization.

Key words: small and medium-sized shareholders, corporate financialization, corporate governance, pressure hypothesis

CLC Number:

F275

Gaofeng Zou,Guangqun Li,Xiong Xiong, et al. Research on the Influence of Minority Shareholders′ Network Expression on Corporate Financialization[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(3): 15-24.

Figures/Tables 9

References 40

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变量	变量定义	计算方法
FinAss1	企业金融化度量1	企业金融资产与企业总资产的比值。其中企业金融资产包括：货币资金、交易性金融资产、持有至到期投资、投资性房地产、可供出售金融资产、长期股权投资、应收股利和应收利息
FinAss2	企业金融化度量2	企业金融资产与企业总资产的比值。其中企业金融资产包括：货币资金、交易性金融资产、持有至到期投资、投资性房地产、可供出售金融资产、应收股利和应收利息
logFinAss1	企业金融化度量3	FinAss1的自然对数
logFinAss2	企业金融化度量4	FinAss2的自然对数
logTpost	发帖总量	某只股票每年总发帖总量的自然对数
logCom	评论量	某只股票每年评论量的自然对数
logNegpost	负面发帖量	某只股票每年负面发帖量的自然对数
logRead	阅读量	某只股票每年阅读量的自然对数
Size	公司规模	年末公司总资产的自然对数
Leverage	公司杠杆	总负债与总资产的比值
CashFlow	现金流比率	经营性现金流量净额与年末固定资产的比值
Age	上市公司时间	公司上市年数的自然对数
Tangible	有形资产比重	固定资产与总资产的比值
SOE	国有公司虚拟变量	国有公司为1，否则为0
Duality	是否二职兼任	董事长和总经理二职合一为1，否则为0
Board	董事会人数	董事会人数的自然对数
InDrc	独立董事的比例	独立董事人数与全部董事人数的比值
First	第一大股东持股	第一大股东的持股比例
ROA	总资产收益率	净收入与总资产的比值
Turn	销售周转率	销售收入与总资产的比率
Analyst	分析师报道	分析师报道数目与1之和的自然对数
News	新闻报道	新闻报道数目与1之和的自然对数

变量	Obs.	Min	25%	Median	Mean	75%	Max	S.D.
FinAss1	31889	0.03	0.13	0.21	0.25	0.33	0.78	0.15
FinAss2	31889	0.00	0.11	0.18	0.21	0.28	0.78	0.14
logTpost	31889	0.38	2.33	2.86	2.88	3.40	7.03	0.82
logCom	31889	0.34	2.67	3.37	3.40	4.10	8.55	1.05
Size	31889	17.88	21.29	22.04	22.26	22.97	31.04	1.43
Leverage	31889	0.06	0.29	0.44	0.45	0.60	0.97	0.20
CashFlow	31889	-1.93	0.04	0.20	0.38	0.49	0.87	0.08
Age	31889	0.69	1.79	2.40	2.33	2.89	3.50	0.65
Tangible	31889	0.00	0.09	0.19	0.22	0.31	0.97	0.16
SOE	31889	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.40	1.00	1.00	0.49
Duality	31889	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	1.00	0.17
Board	31889	0.00	2.20	2.30	2.35	2.48	3.53	0.27
InDrc	31889	0.00	33.33	37.50	38.88	44.44	57.14	9.84
First	31889	0.29	22.69	32.07	34.32	44.43	89.99	15.04
ROA	31889	-0.34	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.23	0.06

变量		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
FinAss1	(1)		0.90	0.14	0.18	-0.09	-0.25	0.25	-0.33	0.00	0.01
FinAss2	(2)	0.90		0.13	0.15	-0.14	-0.27	0.26	-0.34	0.00	0.02
logTpost	(3)	0.13	0.15		0.67	0.42	0.15	0.02	-0.06	-0.12	-0.04
logCom	(4)	0.17	0.16	0.70		0.27	0.21	-0.06	0.03	-0.07	0.11
Size	(5)	-0.06	-0.10	0.43	0.30		0.48	0.05	-0.02	0.14	-0.07
Leverage	(6)	-0.24	-0.26	0.16	0.21	0.49		-0.14	0.00	0.04	-0.04
CashFlow	(7)	0.11	0.12	0.03	0.00	0.06	-0.01		-0.21	0.04	0.00
Tangible	(8)	-0.34	-0.35	-0.04	0.05	0.02	0.04	-0.10		0.08	-0.02
First	(9)	0.00	0.02	-0.11	-0.06	0.18	0.05	0.00	0.09		0.02
InDrc	(10)	0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.14	-0.04	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	0.03

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
变量	FinAss1	FinAss1	FinAss2	FinAss2	FinAss1	FinAss1	FinAss2	FinAss2
logTpost	0.024^**	0.009^**	0.010^**	0.003^**
	(18.32)	(9.47)	(11.45)	(3.60)
logCom					0.028^**	0.009^**	0.010^**	0.004^**
					(19.48)	(10.50)	(11.86)	(4.22)
Size		-0.006^**		-0.010^**		-0.006^**		-0.010^**
		(-5.88)		(-10.36)		(-5.91)		(-10.57)
Leverage		-0.042^**		-0.034^**		-0.042^**		-0.034^**
		(-42.48)		(-36.93)		(-42.54)		(-36.95)
CashFlow		0.009^**		0.009^**		0.009^**		0.009^**
		(12.25)		(12.98)		(12.27)		(12.99)
Age		0.016^**		0.004^**		0.015^**		0.004^**
		(17.67)		(12.98)		(17.42)		(5.03)
Tangible		-0.048^**		-0.039^**		-0.048^**		-0.039^**
		(-57.00)		(-49.70)		(-57.00)		(-49.70)
SOE		0.010^**		0.010^**		0.010^**		0.010^**
		(10.93)		(11.66)		(10.99)		(11.69)
Duality		0.003^**		0.002^**		0.003^**		0.003^**
		(3.91)		(3.80)		(3.94)		(3.80)
Board		0.001		0.001		0.001		0.001
		(0.90)		(1.20)		(0.84)		(1.18)
InDrc		0.000		0.001		0.000		0.001
		(0.47)		(0.813)		(0.53)		(0.84)
First		0.006^**		0.007^**		0.007^**		0.007^**
		(8.17)		(9.16)		(8.33)		(9.26)
ROA		0.012^**		0.013^**		0.012^**		0.013^**
		(14.11)		(16.65)		(14.18)		(16.71)
Turn		-0.005**		0.002^*		-0.005^**		0.002^*
		(-6.18)		(1.96)		(-6.07)		(2.00)
Intercept	0.220^**	0.270^**	0.166^**	0.209^**	0.221^**	0.261^**	0.176^**	0.206^**
	(28.86)	(39.07)	(23.42)	(32.19)	(29.23)	(37.97)	(25.02)	(31.85)
Industry	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	31889	31889	31889	31889	31889	31889	31889	31889
R²(%)	73.10	80.40	72.78	77.52	75.59	80.41	72.76	77.52

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)
	第一阶段	第二阶段
	logTpost	FinAss1	FinAss2
Instrumented logTpost		0.022^**	0.024^**
Instrumented logTpost		(22.88)	(26.68)
CSI 300 dummy	0.431^**
CSI 300 dummy	(25.39)
Intercept	-0.92^**	0.257^**	0.202^**
Intercept	(-22.88)	(37.67)	(31.55)
Control	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	31889	31889	31889
R²(%)	45.44	80.66	78.00
Correlation test
F-statistic	204.73
Exogenous test
Hansen J-statistic		0.85	0.91

Research on the Influence of Minority Shareholders′ Network Expression on Corporate Financialization

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Panel A. First stage regression
	logTpost
Industry-average logTpost	0.290^**
Industry-average logTpost	(15.30)
Control	Yes
N	31899
R²(%)	64.39
Panel B. Second stage regression
	(1)	(2)
	FinAss1	FinAss2
logTpost	0.009^**	0.003^**
logTpost	(8.25)	(3.48)
IMR	0.181^**	0.173^**
IMR	(3.45)	(3.27)
Intercept	0.206^**	0.202^**
Intercept	(30.23)	(31.22)
Control	Yes	Yes
Industry	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes
N	31899	31899
R²(%)	76.43	75.38

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	非国有企业组	国有企业组	非国有企业组	国有企业组
	FinAss1	FinAss1	FinAss2	FinAss2
logTpost	0.011^**	0.004^*	0.006^**	0.002
logTpost	(9.11)	(2.34)	(5.04)	(1.94)
Intercept	0.287^**	0.261^**	0.225^**	0.200^**
Intercept	(28.63)	(27.30)	(23.47)	(22.89)
Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	19250	12639	19250	12639
R²(%)	80.15	78.32	77.47	77.72

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	低分析师关注组	高分析师关注组	低分析师关注组	高分析师关注组
	FinAss1	FinAss1	FinAss2	FinAss2
logTpost	0.011^**	0.003^*	0.006^**	0.001
logTpost	(9.18)	(2.02)	(4.34)	(0.73)
Intercept	0.284^**	0.257^**	0.203^**	0.216^**
Intercept	(27.40)	(27.84)	(23.36)	(22.11)
Industry	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	15945	15944	15945	15944
R²(%)	80.05	81.01	78.45	76.81

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