Abstract:

In the context of the national strategy for the Yellow River basin's ecological protection and high-quality development， the problem of water allocation will come up again. To protect the environment and build a high-quality economy in the Yellow River Basin， water resources must be shared in a fair and reasonable way. The nine provinces （districts） of the Yellow River water supply area are taken as the object of study， and 2020 is taken as the current water use year in this paper. Based on the bankruptcy theory and Nash bargaining game， a model is constructed for water resources allocation in the Yellow River Basin. The model takes account of the inequality of the subject. The system of indicators for assessing each province’s bargaining power is established based on respect for historical and current water use， sustainable development， fairness， and maximization of benefits. And the projection pursuit model of the group search optimization algorithm is used to measure bargaining power. Then， the optimal water resource allocation scheme in the Yellow River basin is obtained based on the linking function of the satisfaction function. The findings indicate that： （1） The proposed water allocation scheme considers the historical allocation result， current water use， economic development， and water reliance of each province. Shandong and Qinghai are at the extremes of high and low bargaining power， respectively. （2） The water allocation scheme obtained using the bankruptcy game maximizes water users’ satisfaction with low water demand and high bargaining power. Water allocation decreases as water demand decreases， but satisfaction increases when bargaining power remains the same. （3） The water resource allocation scheme obtained using the bankruptcy game is the optimal solution based on the utility function of the water allocated to each province with respect to interest and subject inequality. It improves the fairness， rationality， and acceptability of water resource allocation in the Yellow River Basin and provides a new solution to the problem of conflicting water resource allocation in public basins.

Key words: Yellow River Basin, water resource allocation, subject inequality, bankruptcy game, bargaining power