渠道多元化和跨渠道冲突如何影响渠道治理机制的效力？

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.1668

Abstract

Abstract:

The development of Internet technology and e-commerce provide strong support for enterprises to adopt multi-channel selling products. Using different types of channels to sell products has become an important way for enterprise to build competitiveness， but it also poses challenges to manage marketing channel. The implementation of multi-channel marketing not only change the structure of a firm’s channel portfolio， but also has impacts on the inter-organizational relationships and interactive behaviors between firms in a particular channel. Prior literatures on inter-organizational relationships have devoted much attention to channel governance mechanisms， but the effectiveness of channel governance mechanisms in the context of multiple channels is under-researched.To fill the gap in existing research， based on open system theory and the literatures of multi-channel marketing， the effectiveness of channel governance mechanisms in the context of multiple channels is explored by examining the moderating role of channel diversity and cross-channel conflict on the relationship between contractual governance， relational governance and channel opportunism. Manufacturer is taken as the object and the data is obtained by a questionnaire survey. Through multiple regression analysis of data collected from 525 manufacturing firms， the results show that the relationship between channel governance mechanisms and opportunism depends on several multi-channel level contingencies. Specifically， the manufacturer’s channel diversity weakens the effect of contractual governance on opportunism， whereas cross-channel conflict strengthens the relationship between relational governance and opportunism； channel diversity enhances the effects of relational governance on opportunism， but cross-channel conflict weakens the relationship between relational governance and opportunism.The results of this study reveal the effectiveness of channel governance mechanisms in the multi-channel context， not only enrich the study of channel governance， but also have significant implications for future studies. In practice， it provides valuable guidance for the effective implementation of channel governance mechanisms in the context of multiple channels in this paper.

Key words: contractual governance, relational governance, opportunism, channel diversity, cross-channel

CLC Number:

F274

Xingyu Zhao,Guijun Zhuang. How do Channel Diversity and Cross-channel Conflict Affect the Effectiveness of Channel Governance Mechanisms?[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(10): 36-46.

Figures/Tables 7

References 40

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变量	题项	因子载荷
合同治理(CG) Cronbach’s α=0.767 CR=0.771 AVE=0.531	CG1 我公司和该经销商签订了具体而详细的商业合同	0.816
	CG2 我公司和该经销商的合同详细说明了双方的责任和义务	0.697
	CG3当合同执行不能达到预期目标时，合同明确规定了处理问题的细则	0.665
关系型治理（RG） Cronbach’s α=0.802 CR=0.803 AVE=0.504	RG1 我公司和该经销商之间相互信赖	0.680
	RG2 我公司和该经销商有紧密的合作关系	0.756
	RG3 我公司和该经销商之间能够坦诚沟通	0.717
	RG4 我公司和该经销商之间有良好的合作氛围	0.685
投机行为（OP） Cronbach’s α=0.857 CR=0.859 AVE=0.607	OP1 该经销商为了得到他们想要的利益，会隐瞒事实或相关信息	0.675
	OP2 该经销商为了自己的利益会不遵守双方签订的协议	0.830
	OP3 该经销商会利用我公司工作上的疏忽来为自己谋取私利	0.849
	OP4 该经销商会利用合同的漏洞，让我公司承担额外的责任或费用	0.750
渠道多元化（MD） Cronbach’s α=0.758 CR=0.793 AVE=0.574	MD1 为了销售产品，我公司采用了多种不同种类的渠道	0.773
	MD2 我公司的销售渠道是多样化的	0.925
	MD3 为了销售该产品，我公司既有传统的经销商渠道，也开有网店	0.517
跨渠道冲突（CC） Cronbach’s α=0.883 CR=0.819 AVE=0.602	CC1 在一些重要的问题上，我公司的多条渠道之间常常有利益不一致的情况	0.751
	CC2 我公司的多条渠道之间常常有利益上的冲突	0.934
	CC3 我公司的多条渠道之间在利益上很难协调	0.862
行业环境不确定性（IU） Cronbach’s α=0.763 CR=0.888 AVE=0.727	IU1 我公司所在行业的产品品种变化很快	0.728
	IU2 我公司所在行业的技术变化很快	0.729
	IU3 我公司所在行业的产品的供求情况变化很快	0.700

变量	均值	标准差	CG	RG	OP	MD	CC	IU
合同治理（CG）	5.379	0.817	0.729	0.381^**	-0.501^**	0.122^**	-0.341^**	0.337^**
关系型治理（RG）	5.291	0.789	0.381^**	0.710	-0.346^**	0.150^**	-0.159^**	0.281^**
投机行为（OP）	3.021	1.232	-0.502^**	-0.346^**	0.779	0.014	0.443^**	-0.295^**
渠道多元化（MD）	4.589	1.237	0.122^**	0.150^**	0.013	0.758	0.143^**	0.244^**
跨渠道冲突（CC）	3.572	1.418	-0.339^**	-0.158^**	0.440^**	0.144^**	0.776	-0.087^*
行业环境不确定性（IU）	4.974	0.860	0.338^**	0.281^**	-0.297^**	0.245^**	-0.085^*	0.853
年龄（标记变量）			0.046	0.009	-0.046	0.010	0.033	0.051

变量	因变量：合同治理	因变量：关系型治理
自变量
渠道多元化	0.121^**	0.129^**
跨渠道冲突	-0.268^***	-0.102^*
行业环境不确定性	0.286^***	0.228^***
关系长度	0.024	0.099^*
企业规模	-0.080^*	-0.067
市场化水平	0.007	0.076
企业行业（服装纺织业）	0.013	-0.030
企业行业（机械制造业）	0.195^***	0.051
企业行业（电子制造业）	0.184^***	0.107^*
R²	0.284	0.136
调整R²	0.271	0.121
F值	25.646^***	8.980^***

变量	因变量：投机行为
变量	模型1	模型2	模型3
自变量
合同治理	-0.263^***	-0.263^***	-0.245^***
关系型治理	-0.143^***	-0.143^***	-0.174^***
调节变量
渠道多元化		0.015	0.005
跨渠道冲突		0.323^***	0.340^***
交互项
合同治理×渠道多元化			0.073†
合同治理×跨渠道冲突			-0.116^**
关系型治理×渠道多元化			-0.067†
关系型治理×跨渠道冲突			0.102^**
控制变量
行业环境不确定性	-0.188^***	-0.228^***	-0.201^***
关系长度	0.027	0.015	0.024
企业规模	0.121^**	0.090^*	0.098^**
市场化水平	-0.294^***	-0.103^*	-0.075
企业行业（服装纺织业）	-0.031	-0.035	-0.032
企业行业（机械制造业）	-0.057	-0.035	-0.043
企业行业（电子制造业）	-0.086^*	-0.048	-0.058
R²	0.327	0.392	0.411
调整R²	0.315	0.379	0.394
F值	27.805^***	30.067^***	23.720^***

How do Channel Diversity and Cross-channel Conflict Affect the Effectiveness of Channel Governance Mechanisms?

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