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中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (2): 250-262.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.1693cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.1693

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考虑新能源供能波动的电力需求响应机制设计研究

张芸荣1, 陈志祥2, 洪兆富3()   

  1. 1.兰州大学管理学院,甘肃 兰州 730000
    2.中山大学管理学院,广东 广州 510275
    3.西北工业大学管理学院,陕西 西安 710072
  • 收稿日期:2023-10-13 修回日期:2024-07-16 出版日期:2026-02-25 发布日期:2026-02-04
  • 通讯作者: 洪兆富 E-mail:hongzhf@nwpu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72201118);国家自然科学基金项目(72571214);国家自然科学基金项目(72171104)

Demand Response Mechanism Design within the Supply Fluctuations of Renewable Energy

Yunrong Zhang1, Zhixiang Chen2, Zhaofu Hong3()   

  1. 1.School of management,Lanzhou University,Lanzhou 730000,China
    2.Sun Yat-sen business school,Sun Yat-sen university,Guangzhou 510275,China
    3.School of Management,Northwestern Polytechnical University,Xi’an 710072,China
  • Received:2023-10-13 Revised:2024-07-16 Online:2026-02-25 Published:2026-02-04
  • Contact: Zhaofu Hong E-mail:hongzhf@nwpu.edu.cn

摘要:

随着新能源大规模参与电力市场,电力系统面临严峻的供需平衡挑战。然而,现有的电力需求响应机制,包括分时定价机制以及激励型需求响应机制,无法有效解决新能源供能波动对电力供需平衡带来的影响。基于此,本文立足新能源大规模参与电力供应的现实背景,构建了系统运营商与电力用户之间的 Stackelberg 博弈模型,以分析考虑新能源供能波动时,具有不同紧急供能倾向的系统运营商的机制设计与选择决策。研究结果表明系统运营商的紧急供能控制倾向对不同类型需求响应机制设计决策的影响有显著差别。例如,在激励需求响应机制下,厌恶型系统运营商将根据市场中的固定电价调节其激励策略;然而,该结论对参与激励需求响应机制的许可型系统运营商,以及参与价格型需求响应机制的系统运营商将不再成立。此外,本文还发现需求响应机制并非总是最优的选择,以及对于不同类型电力需求响应机制而言,不存在绝对占优的紧急能源控制策略。最后,本文通过比较不同类型需求响应机制在推动电力用户参与方面的效率,提出阈值政策,为系统运营商选择合理的需求响应机制提供决策支撑。

关键词: 能源供应链, 新能源, 需求响应, 机制设计

Abstract:

Upgrading energy structure can effectively reduce the carbon emissions of the energy system, which have significantly promoted the integration of renewable energies into the electricity system. With the increasing use of renewable energy in the electricity market generation, the electricity market faces severer supply fluctuation and imbalance challenges. Demand-response programs, such as the price-based program and the incentive-based program, are widely used to induce consumers to change their electricity consumption patterns. However, the existing demand-response program mainly focused on the load management, and has barely considered the impact of renewable energy supply fluctuations. Motivated by these practical challenges, a Stackelberg game model between the electricity system operators and end users is constructed to investigate when the renewable energy integrates into the electricity supply system, how the system operator’s emergency energy control strategy influences the system operator’s demand-response mechanism design decision. The results show that the effect of emergency energy control strategy on the design decision differs for different demand-response programs. For example, under the incentive-based demand-response program, the system operator who does not use the emergency energy will adjust its incentive strategy according to the fixed electricity price in the market; Otherwise, the mechanism design decision of the system operator who implements the price-based program or is willing to use the emergency energy under the incentive-based program, is independent to the fixed electricity price. In addition, the results show that demand-response programs are not always the optimal choice, and there is also no dominant emergency energy control strategy for the two types of demand-response programs. Finally, the two types of demand-response mechanisms are compared with respect to their efficiency in improving the responsiveness of the consumers. The results of this paper can help the system operator to clearly understand the effect of renewable energy supply fluctuations on the electricity market and select a reasonable demand-response mechanism, providing decision support for design of the electricity market trading mechanism.

Key words: energy supply chain, renewable energy, demand-response programs, mechanism design

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