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主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
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中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (1): 353-368.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.0150cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.0150

• • 上一篇    

“优胜者选拔”还是“优胜者回避”?集团成员企业对外直接投资遴选机制研究

刘鹏琦1, 吕萍2()   

  1. 1.中国科学院大学中丹学院,北京 100190
    2.中国科学院大学经济与管理学院,北京 100190
  • 收稿日期:2024-01-27 修回日期:2025-01-15 出版日期:2026-01-25 发布日期:2026-01-29
  • 通讯作者: 吕萍 E-mail:lvping@ucas.ac.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金面上项目(71872168)

"Winner Picking" or "Winner Avoiding"? Selection Mechanism for Outward Foreign Direct Investment by China's Business Group Affiliates

Pengqi Liu1, Ping Lv2()   

  1. 1.Sino-Danish College,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China
    2.School of Economics and Management,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China
  • Received:2024-01-27 Revised:2025-01-15 Online:2026-01-25 Published:2026-01-29
  • Contact: Ping Lv E-mail:lvping@ucas.ac.cn

摘要:

近年来,集团成员企业对外直接投资的规模不断扩大,但究竟什么样的成员企业会在企业集团内部“脱颖而出”开展对外直接投资活动,一直备受争议。本文以2008—2021年中国上市公司为样本,通过构建“优胜者”指数,探讨集团成员企业的对外直接投资遴选机制。研究结果表明,企业集团在对外直接投资过程中会遵循“优胜者选拔”的遴选机制,“优胜者”指数越高的成员企业进行对外直接投资的概率、频次及规模也越大;企业集团内部竞争越激烈,“优胜者选拔”的遴选机制对成员企业对外直接投资的促进效应越强;成员企业的委托代理问题越严重,“优胜者选拔”的遴选机制对成员企业对外直接投资的促进效应越弱。异质性分析表明,“优胜者选拔”的遴选机制在成员企业产权性质为国有、进入模式为跨国并购及资产规模较大时更明显。本文从理论上有助于厘清企业集团国际化战略决策的微观机理,在实践上为企业集团实施有效的对外直接投资策略提供了经验证据与政策参考。

关键词: 企业集团, 对外直接投资, 遴选机制, 委托代理

Abstract:

In recent years, the scale of outward foreign direct investment by China’s business group affiliates have continued to expand, but what kind of affiliates will be picked up within the business group to carry out foreign direct investment activities has been controversial. Chinese listed companies from 2008 to 2021 are used as a sample to explore the selection mechanism for outward foreign direct investment within business groups. The winner index is employed to gauge the performance of these affiliates. The research results show that business groups tend to follow a “winner picking” selection mechanism in the process of outward foreign direct investment. This means that affiliates with higher winner index scores have a greater probability, frequency, and scale of engaging in foreign direct investment. Taking into account the internal competition within business groups, the results reveal that the “winner picking” selection mechanism has a more pronounced promotional effect on affiliates that face more intense competition. In terms of principal-agent problem, the results suggest that the promotion effect of the “winner picking” selection mechanism is weaker for affiliates with higher corporate agency costs. Heterogeneity analysis demonstrates that the “winner picking” selection mechanism is more pronounced when affiliates are state-owned, employ cross-border mergers and acquisitions as their entry mode, and possess larger asset scales. From a theoretical perspective, it helps elucidate the micro-mechanisms governing the international strategic decision-making of business groups. It also expands relevant research on the internationalization behavior of business groups, drawing from principal-agent theory and competition theory. Practically, empirical evidence is provided to assist affiliates in implementing effective foreign direct investment strategies.

Key words: Business groups, outward foreign direct investment, selection mechanism, agency costs

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