考虑保险理赔模式和政府补贴的再制造产品市场优化策略

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0455

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

政府和企业为激发再制造产品的市场活力，开始探索“保险+再制造”的创新模式，保险公司作为决策主体，其保险理赔模式和再制造费率优惠对再制造产品的推广应用具有重要影响。本文构建保险公司两种保险理赔模式下的动态博弈模型，研究保险公司的保险理赔模式、再制造费率优惠以及政府补贴方式对闭环供应链利益相关方均衡决策、需求和利润的影响。结果表明：保险公司仅将再制造零部件纳入维修备件体系的运营模式并不总能推广更多再制造零部件，当产品零部件理赔率高于某阈值时，保险公司同时将新零部件和再制造零部件纳入维修备件体系，能够推广更多再制造零部件；政府补贴能够提高再制造商的收益，并且，补贴使用再制造零部件的消费者比补贴再制造商更有利，但对制造商的利润损害也更大；然而，政府补贴对保险公司收益的影响还与单位补贴额有关，政府补贴在补贴额较大时能够提高保险公司利润，并且，补贴使用再制造零部件的消费者效果更好，但政府补贴在补贴额较小时将损害保险公司利润。

关键词: 再制造, 保险理赔模式, 保险费率优惠, 政府补贴, 斯塔克伯格博弈

Abstract:

To stimulate the market vitality of remanufactured products， the government and enterprises are implementing an innovative model of “insurance+remanufacturing”. Insurance claims patterns and remanufacturing rate concession decisions by insurance companies significantly impact the promotion of remanufactured products. A critical issue to explore is optimizing the market for remanufactured products by setting up a reasonable insurance claim model， remanufacturing rate concessions， and government subsidies. Considering two claims models of insurers， dynamic game models are constructed to investigate the effects of insurance claims models， remanufacturing rate discounts， and government subsidy strategies on the equilibrium decisions， demand， and profits of closed-loop supply chain stakeholders. The results show that：The insurer’s operating model of only incorporating remanufactured parts into the repair parts system is not always the optimal way to promote remanufactured parts. When the insurance claim rate is higher than a certain threshold， the insurer can promote more remanufactured parts by incorporating both new and remanufactured parts in the repair parts system. Government subsidies can increase the profit of the remanufacturer， and subsidizing consumers who use remanufactured parts is more beneficial than subsidizing the remanufacturer， but it is also more damaging to the manufacturer’s profit. However， the impact of government subsidies on the insurer’s profits also depends on the subsidy amount. Specifically， government subsidies can increase the insurer’s profit when the subsidy amount is large， and subsidizing consumers who use remanufactured parts can increase the profit more than subsidizing the remanufacturer， but government subsidies will hurt the insurer’s profit when the subsidy amount is small. Finally， numerical experiments are carried out to verify this paper's important conclusions and inferences. The findings of this paper will not only provide management insights for manufacturers/remanufacturers and insurers， but will also provide decision support to governments in developing their subsidy strategies.

Key words: remanufacturing, insurance claims model, insurance rate discounts, government subsidies, game theory

中图分类号:

F405

张丽敏,李凯,周陶. 考虑保险理赔模式和政府补贴的再制造产品市场优化策略[J]. 中国管理科学, 2025, 33(12): 239-252.

Limin Zhang,Kai Li,Tao Zhou. Market Optimization Strategy for Remanufactured Products Considering Insurance Claims Model and Government Subsidies[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(12): 239-252.

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