不同再制造模式下的供应链区块链采纳策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.1725

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

原设备制造商（OEM）可通过构建区块链体系为合作的第三方再制造商（TPR）提供区块链认证服务，从而消除消费者对再制造产品质量的认知模糊。但这会给再制造模式的选择带来不确定性。基于新产品和再制造产品竞争的背景，分别在外包和授权两种模式下构建了不同区块链采用策略的数量博弈模型，并分析了模型均衡结果。研究发现，无论外包还是授权，当单位区块链成本小于某阈值时，TPR采纳区块链有利于提升再制品数量，形成经济利益的“双赢”。但随着区块链成本的增大，采纳区块链可能形成“利益冲突”甚至“双输”局面；从经济利润角度，无论是否采纳区块链，OEM一定更偏好于外包模式。从区块链经济价值角度，OEM在单位区块链成本较高时可能偏好于授权模式。而TPR的再制造模式偏好取决于消费者再制造偏好、区块链提升的再制品质量信任度、区块链成本、废旧品回收成本系数的综合影响；混合区块链策略能在增大再制品需求的同时降低区块链再制品价格，除非废旧品回收成本系数较高，该策略会同时受到OEM和TPR的偏好。

关键词: 再制造供应链, 产品竞争, 再制造模式选择, 区块链采纳

Abstract:

In practice， although remanufactured products compete with new products， well-known Original Equipment Manufacturers （OEMs） typically engage in remanufacturing operations with Third - Party Remanufacturers （TPRs） through two cooperation models： outsourcing and authorization due to considerations of brand image， intellectual property， and distribution channels. The two models exhibit substantial differences in pricing authority and profit allocation， making the selection of remanufacturing modes strategically critical. Concurrently， consumer ambiguity regarding the quality attributes of remanufactured products has heightened interest in blockchain technology. Some OEMs employ blockchain systems to provide TPRs with certification services that enhance consumer trust. However， persistent biases against remanufactured products and blockchain implementation costs not only undermine TPRs’ motivations for blockchain adoption but also amplify the complexity of operational mode selection for both parties， thereby diminishing blockchain’s potential value. Existing research rarely integrates the analysis of cooperative models in remanufacturing supply chains with blockchain adoption strategies.Game theory integrated with decision optimization approaches and computer simulation methods are employed to systematically investigate blockchain adoption strategies between OEMs and TPRs under different remanufacturing modes. First， based on blockchain’s role in enhancing consumer trust， inverse demand functions are derived for new and remanufactured products with/without blockchain hrough consumer utility analysis combined with the critical payment threshold approach. Second， considering factors including end-of-life product collection costs， remanufacturing cost savings， and blockchain implementation expenses， four decision models are constructed and solved corresponding to different operational modes and blockchain strategies： outsourcing without blockchain （ON）， outsourcing with blockchain （OB）， authorization without blockchain （AN）， and authorization with blockchain （AB）. Third， by analyzing the equilibrium solutions， blockchain’s impacts on remanufactured product pricing， market demand， and economic profits are examined， revealing distinct blockchain adoption motivations under outsourcing versus authorization modes. The preference mechanisms for cooperative modes are further elucidated through dual perspectives of economic benefits and blockchain value creation. Finally， extended investigations evaluate supply chain performance and mode selection under hybrid blockchain strategies.The research findings reveal that under both outsourcing and authorization modes， blockchain adoption facilitates a “win-win” scenario by increasing remanufactured product quantities when unit blockchain costs remain below a critical threshold. However， the increase in unit blockchain costs may transform it into either a “conflict-of-interest” trigger or even a “lose-lose” proposition. From an economic profit perspective， OEMs consistently prefer outsourcing regardless of blockchain adoption status. Yet regarding blockchain’s economic value creation， OEMs may favor authorization mode only when blockchain costs are relatively high. For TPRs， remanufacturing mode preferences depend on four critical parameters： remanufactured product valuation discounts， blockchain-driven trust enhancement， unit blockchain costs， and end-of-life product recovery cost coefficients. Hybrid blockchain strategies demonstrate dual advantages in boosting remanufactured product demand while reducing blockchain-associated pricing premiums. Such strategies are mutually preferred by both OEMs and TPRs unless confronted with exceptionally high recovery cost coefficients. Theoretical and managerial implications for optimizing remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain operations are provided while enhancing synergistic value creation across economic and environmental dimensions. It is also conducive to the promotion of blockchain technology under complex conditions， and provides a reference path for the digital and green transformation of manufacturing enterprises.

Key words: remanufacturing supply chain, production competition, remanufacturing mode selection, blockchain adoption

中图分类号:

F270.5

高鹏,聂佳佳,陆玉梅, 等. 不同再制造模式下的供应链区块链采纳策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(10): 287-300.

Peng Gao,Jiajia Nie,Yumei Lu, et al. Research on the Blockchain Adoption Strategy of Supply Chain under Different Remanufacturing Modes[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(10): 287-300.

图/表 11

表1

本文所有参数及变量符号说明"

参数和变量	说明	参数和变量	说明
$p n, p r$	新产品、再制品的价格	$c n, c r, c$	新产品单位成本,再制品单位成本,再制造单位节约成本
$q n, q r$	新产品、再制品（废旧品）数量	$k$	废旧品回收成本系数
$w$	外包模式下OEM支付给TPR的单位外包费用	$b$	TPR承担的单位区块链成本
$v$	消费者对新产品的质量估值，服从[0,1]上的均匀分布	$b x$	各单位区块链成本阈值， $x$ 为 $1, 11$ 中的整数
$θ$	消费者对再制品的估值折扣, $0 < θ < 1$	$π j i$	i决策模式下供应链成员j的利润, $i ∈ O N, O B, A N, A B, O M B, A M B$ , $j ∈ M, R$
$β$	无区块链时消费者对再制品质量的信任度， $0 < β < 1$	$Δ v j i$	i再制造模式下TPR采纳区块链对成员j的经济价值, $Δ v j i = π j i B - π j i N$ , $i ∈ O, A$ , $j ∈ M, R$
$U j i$	i状态下消费者购买产品j的净效用, $i ∈ N, B$ , $j ∈ n, r$

表1

图1

表2

灵敏度分析结果"

模式	$q n i *$	$q r i *$	$p n i *$	$p r i *$	$w i *$	$f i *$	$π M i *$	$π R i *$
↑参数k
ON	↑	↓	—	↑	↑	/	↓	↓↑ $k > β θ (1 - β θ)$ 时 $k < β θ (1 - β θ)$ 时
OB	↑	↓	—	↑	↑	/	↓	↓ $k > θ 1 - θ$ 时 $k < θ 1 - θ$ 时
AN	↑	↓	—	↑	/	—	↓	↑↓
AB			—		/	—
↑参数 $β$
ON	↑	↑	—	↑	↑	/	↑	↑
OB	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
AN	↓	↑	—	↑	/	↑	↑	↑
AB	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

表2

表3

ON和OB的市场绩效比较结果"

b阈值		b₁	b₂
$w *$	$w O N * < w O B *$
$p r *$	$p r O N * < p r O B *$
$q r *$	$q r O N * < q r O B *$	$q r O N * > q r O B *$
$p n *$	$p n O N * = p n O B *$
$q n *$	$q n O N * > q n O B *$		$q n O N * < q n O B *$

表3

表4

AN和AB的市场绩效比较结果a. c < c1"

b阈值		b₃	b₄	b₅
$f *$	$f A N * < f A B *$			$f A N * > f A B *$
$p r *$	$p r A N * < p r A B *$
$q r *$	$q r A N * < q r A B *$	$q r A N * > q r A B *$
$p n *$	$p n A N * = p n A B *$
$q n *$	$q n A N * > q n A B *$		$q n A N * < q n A B *$
b阈值		b₃	b₅	b₄
$f *$	$f A N * < f A B *$		$f A N * > f A B *$
$p r *$	$p r A N * < p r A B *$
$q r *$	$q r A N * < q r A B *$	$q r A N * > q r A B *$
$p n *$	$p n A N * = p n A B *$
$q n *$	$q n A N * > q n A B *$			$q n A N * < q n A B *$
b阈值		b₅	b₃	b₄
$f *$	$f A N * < f A B *$	$f A N * > f A B *$
$p r *$	$p r A N * < p r A B *$
$q r *$	$q r A N * < q r A B *$		$q r A N * > q r A B *$
$p n *$	$p n A N * = p n A B *$
$q n *$	$q n A N * > q n A B *$			$q n A N * < q n A B *$

表4

图2

图3

表5

区块链的经济价值Δvji*的表达式"

M （OEM）

R （TPR）

O （外包）

θ c - b 2 f m 1 - β 2 θ 2 c 2 f m 2 4 f m 1 f m 2

k θ c - b 2 f m 1 2 - β 2 θ 2 c 2 f m 2 2 8 f m 1 2 f m 2 2

A（授权）

θ c - b 2 f m 3 - β 2 θ 2 c 2 f m 4 4 f m 3 f m 4

θ c - b 2 f m 3 2 k + 2 θ - β 2 θ 2 c 2 f m 4 2 k + 2 β θ 8 f m 3 2 f m 4 2

表5

图4

图5

图6

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