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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (9): 105-115.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0721cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0721

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

政府碳税与补贴政策对外包再制造影响研究

夏西强, 李飚   

  1. 郑州大学商学院，河南 郑州450001
  • 收稿日期:2020-04-21 修回日期:2020-09-01 出版日期:2022-09-20 发布日期:2022-09-01
  • 通讯作者: 李飚(1988-)，男（汉族），河南郑州人，郑州大学商学院，讲师，研究方向：绿色供应链、再制造管理、博弈论，Email：lib0023@zzu.edu.cn. E-mail:lib0023@zzu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目（71702174）；教育部人文社科资助项目（21YJ630140）；河南省高校科技创新人才资助项目(21-CX-007)

A Study on the Impact of Government Carbon Tax and Subsidy Policies on Outsourced Remanufacturing

XIA Xi-qiang, LI Biao   

  1. School of Business, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China
  • Received:2020-04-21 Revised:2020-09-01 Online:2022-09-20 Published:2022-09-01
  • Contact: 李飚 E-mail:lib0023@zzu.edu.cn

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摘要： 为分析政府碳税与补贴政策对外包再制造影响，基于政府两种政策构建了外包再制造下制造/再制造博弈模型。基于博弈模型，对比分析政府两种对策对外包再制造下最优解的影响，研究主要得到：政府补贴政策可以有效提高废旧产品回收率，但只有当单位新产品碳税额度只有大于某一阈值时，政府碳税政策才会提高废旧产品回收率；政府采取补贴政策时，原始制造商通过降低单位再制造产品外包费用来获取政府补贴；政府采取碳税政策时，原始制造商通过提高单位新产品零售价格，把部分碳税转移给消费者；政府补贴政策可以同时增加原始制造商和再制造商收益；政府碳税政策可以增加再制造商收益，但只有单位新产品碳税额度大于某一阈值时，才可以增加原始制造商收益；当单位新产品对环境造成影响一定，并且单位再制造产品对环境造成影响与单位新产品对环境造成影响之比大于某一阈值时，政府补贴政策对环境造成影响最大、政府碳税政策对环境造成影响最小。

关键词: 碳税;补贴;外包再制造;博弈论

Abstract: The government adopts carbon tax policy and subsidy policy in order to promote the development of remanufacturing industry. Thus, in order to analyze the influence of two government policies on outsourcing remanufacturing, the two game models between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a remanufacturer are constructed based on the government carbon tax and government subsidy policies respectively. Based on the two game models, firstly, the impact of the two government policies on the optimal solution of manufacturing/remanufacturing is compared and analyzed; secondly, the impact of the two government policies on the environment is analyzed; finally, some management inspirations are givenbasing on the analysis and the actual situation. The main results are as follows: government subsidy policy could effectively promote waste product recycling, while when the government adopts carbon tax policy, it could only effectively promote waste product recycling when the unit carbon tax of new product is greater than a certain threshold. When the government adopts the subsidy policy, the OEM could obtain the government subsidy by reducing the unit outsourcing cost of remanufacturing products to increase their own profit. When the government adopts the carbon tax policy, the OEM transfer part of the carbon tax to consumers by increasing the unit retail price of new products. The government subsidy policy could increase the profit of OEM and the remanufacturer, and the government carbon tax policy could only increase the income of the OEM when the unit carbon tax quota of new product exceeds a certain threshold. Compared with the unit environmental impact of new product, when the unit environmental impact of remanufactured product is greater than a certain threshold value, the government adopts subsidy policy to have the greatest impact on the environment, while the government adopts carbon tax policy to have the least impact. When the government adopts the carbon tax policy, it could effectively promote the remanufacturing production and improve the initiative of remanufacturers. However, the carbon tax levied on new products is not as small as possible, but should be larger than a certain threshold.

Key words: Carbon tax; subsidy; outsourcing remanufacturing; game theory

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