区块链技术赋能的馈赠型产品供应链隐私保护与信誉维护决策研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0496

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

应用区块链技术能在一定程度上扼制赝品销售，但却引发了产品受众的隐私担忧问题，那么，针对不同区块链使用情景与产销模式，产品受众偏好将会如何影响馈赠型产品市场呢？基于Hotelling模型，构建了由供应商、零售商、消费者及受赠者组成的链上链下两条供应链，探索了受众偏好在不同市场环境中对供应链成员决策以及供应链间竞争的影响。结果表明：受赠者不满意度对两条供应链的隐私保护水平和信誉维护水平有十分重要的影响；随着消费者对链上链下的价格敏感系数之差的增大，供应链市场占有率随之增加，但供应链的最优隐私保护水平和信誉维护水平会降低；消费者对产品服务偏好的差异化更有利于市场环境的净化；特别地，受众偏好会对产销一体化企业产生更大的影响，这意味着产销一体化企业在提升市场竞争力方面更应注重产品受众偏好。

关键词: 区块链技术, 隐私保护, 信誉维护, 馈赠型产品, Hotelling模型

Abstract:

“Courtesy demands reciprocity” is deeply rooted in Chinese social culture， and the proverb “Courtesy on one side only lasts not long” is a driving force behind the prevalence of gift-giving in various public social settings. Typically， the act of giving a gift serves as an expression of respect or concern for the recipient， or it may involve seeking something in return. In the case of utilitarian goods with a purpose or assistance in mind， the gift-giver must consider not only the quality of the items but also the protection of the recipient’s privacy. Enterprises， as providers of goods， must also grapple with these considerations. The traceability function of blockchain technology can partially mitigate the sale of counterfeit products， alleviating consumers' concerns about product quality. However， it is crucial to note that the application of blockchain technology is not entirely without risk. When consumers' private information becomes part of the blockchain due to a transaction， the enterprise may not explicitly guarantee that it won't be used for other purposes. This potential misuse of personal information increases the risk of exposing other sensitive data about consumers and can negatively impact the reputation of the enterprises involved. Considering the specific social and cultural context of China， it is indeed worthwhile to explore the impact of blockchain technology's empowerment on decision-making within the gift product supply chain.The application of blockchain technology can indeed curb the sale of counterfeit products to a certain extent， but it also gives rise to privacy concerns among various stakeholders， including gift-givers （consumers） and recipients. To delve deeper into this issue， it is approached from different blockchain application scenarios and production/marketing modes. Hotelling model is employed to construct a competition model for the gift product supply chain. This model allows us to analyze the evolving impact of product audience preferences on the gift product market. Furthermore， the conditions under which the integration of blockchain technology are investigated into the gift product supply chain is viable.The results reveal that consumer cost aversion， cost regret， and recipient dissatisfaction exert a significant influence on the decision-making processes of supply chain members. Specifically， the recipient's focus on product features directly impacts the service level and market share of the supply chain. Conversely， consumer undifferentiated preferences not only weaken the recipient's influence but also reduce the gift supply chain's willingness to combat counterfeit products by implementing blockchain technology. Furthermore， when recipients place greater emphasis on safeguarding their privacy information， an increase in recipient dissatisfaction leads to an expansion of off-chain market share and an enhancement of on-chain privacy protection. However， it also results in a reduction of on-chain market share and off-chain reputation maintenance levels. As the gap between cost aversion and cost regret narrows， the impact of recipient dissatisfaction on supply chain members' decision-making and market share diminishes. Additionally， in cases where both on-chain information leakage and off-chain sale of counterfeit products are present， it is found that， compared to decentralized decision-making， product audience preferences wield a more substantial influence on the service level and market share of the supply chain when centralized decision-making is adopted. This underscores the importance for integrated production and marketing enterprises to prioritize audience preferences when seeking to enhance market competitiveness. Moreover， for gift product supply chains that integrate production and marketing， it is imperative to consider the preferences of the product audience when contemplating the introduction of blockchain technology.

Key words: blockchain technology, privacy protection, reputation maintenance, gifts products, Hotelling model

中图分类号:

C934

袁红平,张莉,曹兵兵. 区块链技术赋能的馈赠型产品供应链隐私保护与信誉维护决策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(2): 336-347.

Hongping Yuan,Li Zhang,Bingbing Cao. Research on Privacy Protection and Reputation Maintenance Decision of Gift Product Supply Chain Enabled by Blockchain Technology[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(2): 336-347.

图/表 16

图1

图2

图3

表1

符号说明"

符号	说明
$p$	产品的零售价格
$c B$	消费者私人信息泄漏后的厌恶成本， $c B > 0$
$c N$	消费者购买到赝品的后悔成本， $c N > 0$
$a$	消费者对链上零售商的隐私保护水平的敏感系数
$b$	消费者对链下零售商的信誉维护水平的敏感系数
$t$	单位匹配成本
$D i j$	市场占有率， $i = B, N, B C, N C$ , $j = I, L, F, L F$
$v i$	消费者效用， $i = B, N, B C, N C$
$π i j$	局中人的利润， $i = B R, N R, B S, N S, B C, N C$ , $j = I, L, F, L F$
$γ$	受赠者不满意度， $γ ∈ [0,1]$
$k$	消费者对链上产品价格的敏感系数
$r$	消费者对链下产品价格的敏感系数
上标
$I$	链上无信息泄漏，链下无赝品
$L$	链上有信息泄漏，链下无赝品
$F$	链上无信息泄漏，链下有赝品
$L F$	链上有信息泄漏，链下有赝品
下标
$B$	表示该供应链上采用区块链
$N$	表示该供应链未采用区块链
$i R$	供应链 $i$ 上的零售商， $i = B, N$
$i S$	供应链 $i$ 上的供应商， $i = B, N$
$i C$	表示集中决策下的供应链， $i = B, N$
决策变量
$w i j$	批发价格， $i = B, N, B C, N C$ , $j = I, L, F, L F$
$s j (s C j)$	隐私保护水平（集中决策下的隐私保护水平）， $j = I, L, F, L F$
$l j (s C j)$	信誉维护水平（集中决策下的信誉维护水平）， $j = I, L, F, L F$

表1

表2

不同情景下供应链各方的最优决策（博弈均衡解）"

模型	$s j *$	$l j *$	$w B j *$	$w N j *$
I	$3 a 2 p + σ - 6 t 2 6 a t$	$3 b 2 p - σ - 6 t 2 6 b t$	$6 t 2 - σ 3 a 2$	$6 t 2 + σ 3 b 2$
F	$3 a 2 p + σ - 6 t 2 - 2 t γ c N 6 a t$	$3 b 2 p - σ - 6 t 2 + 2 t γ c N 6 b t$	$6 t 2 - σ + 2 t γ c N 3 a 2$	$6 t 2 + σ - 2 t γ c N 3 b 2$
L	$3 a 2 p + σ - 6 t 2 + 2 t γ c B 6 a t$	$3 b 2 p - σ - 6 t 2 - 2 t γ c B 6 b t$	$6 t 2 - σ - 2 t γ c B 3 a 2$	$6 t 2 + σ + 2 t γ c B 3 b 2$
LF	$3 a 2 p + σ - 6 t 2 + 2 t γ (c B - c N) 6 a t$	$3 b 2 p - σ - 6 t 2 + 2 t γ (c N - c B) 6 b t$	$6 t 2 - σ + 2 t γ (c N - c B) 3 a 2$	$6 t 2 + σ + 2 t γ (c B - c N) 3 b 2$

表2

表3

不同情景下链上和链下供应链的市场占有率"

模型	$D B j *$	$D N j *$
I	$6 t 2 - σ 12 t 2$	$6 t 2 + σ 12 t 2$
F	$6 t 2 - σ + 2 t γ c N 12 t 2$	$6 t 2 + σ - 2 t γ c N 12 t 2$
L	$6 t 2 - σ - 2 t γ c B 12 t 2$	$6 t 2 + σ + 2 t γ c B 12 t 2$
LF	$6 t 2 - σ + 2 t γ (c N - c B) 12 t 2$	$6 t 2 + σ + 2 t γ (c B - c N) 12 t 2$

表3

表4

不同情景下供应商的最优利润"

模型	$π B S j *$	$π N S j *$
I	$6 t 2 - σ 2 36 a 2 t 2$	$6 t 2 + σ 2 36 b 2 t 2$
F	$6 t 2 - σ + 2 t γ c N 2 36 a 2 t 2$	$6 t 2 + σ - 2 t γ c N 2 36 b 2 t 2$
L	$6 t 2 - σ - 2 t γ c B 2 36 a 2 t 2$	$6 t 2 + σ + 2 t γ c B 2 36 b 2 t 2$
LF	$6 t 2 - σ + 2 t γ (c N - c B) 2 36 a 2 t 2$	$6 t 2 + σ + 2 t γ (c B - c N) 2 36 b 2 t 2$

表4

表5

不同情景下零售商的最优利润"

模型	$π B R j *$	$π N R j *$
I	$6 t 2 - σ - a 2 p 3 a 2 p + σ - 6 t 2 24 a 2 t 2$	$6 t 2 + σ - b 2 p 3 b 2 p - σ - 6 t 2 24 b 2 t 2$
F	$6 t 2 - σ - a 2 p + 2 t γ c N 3 a 2 p + σ - 6 t 2 - 2 t γ c N 24 a 2 t 2$	$6 t 2 + σ - b 2 p - 2 t γ c N 3 b 2 p - σ - 6 t 2 + 2 t γ c N 24 b 2 t 2$
L	$6 t 2 - σ - a 2 p - 2 t γ c B 3 a 2 p + σ - 6 t 2 + 2 t γ c B 24 a 2 t 2$	$6 t 2 + σ - b 2 p + 2 t γ c B 3 b 2 p - σ - 6 t 2 - 2 t γ c B 24 b 2 t 2$
LF	$6 t 2 - σ - a 2 p + 2 t γ (c N - c B) 3 a 2 p + σ - 6 t 2 + 2 t γ (c B - c N) 24 a 2 t 2$	$6 t 2 + σ - b 2 p + 2 t γ (c B - c N) 3 b 2 p - σ - 6 t 2 + 2 t γ (c N - c B) 24 b 2 t 2$

表5

图4

表6

各参数初始赋值"

参数	$p$	$a$	$b$	$c B$	$c N$	$k$	$r$	$t$
取值	7	3.7	3.4	4.6	4.2	2.8	2.4	5

表6

图5

图6

图7

图8

图9

图10

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