平台型新产品预告信息发布顺序策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.1257

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

在平台型新产品预告中，预告信息的发布顺序选择直接影响到平台上消费者、开发者以及竞争者对新产品的市场预期与策略选择。本文构建了双寡头竞争中三种类型的预告策略（同步、开发者优先和消费者优先）博弈模型，分析了不同策略下的纳什均衡，研究了预告信息市场预期倍增效应、平台用户偏好及其交叉网络效应对竞争动态的影响。研究结果表明：（1）在消费者和开发者的平台偏好都较大或交叉网络效应都较小时，同步预告策略是平台企业利润占优策略；（2）在消费者和开发者的平台偏好或交叉网络效应都为适度大小值时，非同步预告策略下平台企业利润更大，此时优先向平台偏好较小、市场预期倍增效应较小或交叉网络效应较小的平台用户发布新产品信息更有利平台企业利润的最大化；（3）新产品预告的市场预期倍增效应并非总有利于平台企业利润及其社会总福利的增长，适度大小的市场预期倍增效应是上述三种策略被选择的基本条件，超市场预期倍增效应下，平台企业将不进行新产品预告活动。

关键词: 预告顺序, 双边市场, 市场预期, 网络效应, 用户偏好

Abstract:

In planning platform-type new product preannouncement information， the market expectations and strategy choices of consumers， developers， and competitors on the platform for new product preannouncement will be directly affected by the release sequence of the previews. A game model construction method is adopted in this paper to construct game models of three types of preannouncement strategies （synchronous， developer-first， and consumer-first） under a duopoly competition. The new product pricing， the number of participants， platform profit， and social welfare Nash equilibrium under different strategies are analyzed. The internal mechanism of the effects of the market expectation multiplier effect， information asymmetry， user preference， and cross-network effect on the selection of preannouncement strategy is studied. The findings show that： 1） when the platform preference of consumers and developers is large or the cross-network effect is small， the synchronous pre-announcement strategy is the platform enterprise's profit-oriented strategy； 2） The profits of platform firms are higher under the asynchronous preannouncement strategy， and it is more beneficial for platform firms to release the information firstly to the users （consumers and developers） with smaller platform preference or cross-network effect when its platform preference intensity or cross-network effect of both users is a medium value. 3） The expected multiplier effect of new product preannouncement is not always beneficial to the growth of platform firms’ profits and total social welfare， the moderate expected multiplier effect is the basic condition for the above three strategies to be adopted， and platform firms will not conduct any new product announcement activities when the expected multiplier effect is sufficiently large.

Key words: releasing sequence, two-sides market, market expectation, network effect, user preference

中图分类号:

C931

江烨,肖条军. 平台型新产品预告信息发布顺序策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(2): 226-238.

Ye Jiang,Tiaojun Xiao. Releasing Sequence Strategy of Platform-type New Product Information Preannouncement[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(2): 226-238.

图/表 9

图1

表1

策略T下均衡值"

决策变量
消费者定价	$p b i T = t - (1 + k d) β$	消费者数量	$n b i T = (1 + k b) / 2$
开发者定价	$p d i T = f - (1 + k b) α$	开发者数量	$n d i T = (1 + k d) / 2$
输出利润/效用
平台利润	$Π i T = [f (1 + k d) + t (1 + k b)] / 2 - (α + β) (1 + k b) (1 + k d) / 2$
消费者效用	$U b i T = (4 v b - 5 t) / 8 + (1 + k d) (α + 2 β) / 4$
开发者效用	$U d i T = (4 v d - 5 f) / 8 + (1 + k b) (2 α + β) / 4$

表1

表2

策略D下均衡值"

决策变量
消费者定价	$p b i D = t$	消费者数量	$n b i D = (1 + k b) / 2$
开发者定价	$p d i D = f - α (1 + k b) [2 t + β (1 + k d)] / (3 t)$	开发者数量	$n d i D = (1 + k d) / 2$
输出利润/效用
平台利润	$Π i D = [f (1 + k d) + t (1 + k b)] / 2 - α (1 + k b) (1 + k d) [2 t + β (1 + k d)] / (6 t)$
消费者效用	$U b i D = (4 v b - 5 t) / 8 + α (1 + k d) / 4$
开发者效用	$U d i D = (4 v d - 5 f) / 8 + [4 t α + 3 t β + 2 α β (1 + k d)] (1 + k b) / (12 t)$

表2

表3

策略B下均衡值"

决策变量
消费者定价	$p d i B = t - β (1 + k d) [2 f + α (1 + k b)] / (3 f)$	消费者数量	$n b i B = (1 + k b) / 2$
开发者定价	$p d i B = f$	开发者数量	$n d i B = (1 + k d) / 2$
输出利润/效用
平台利润	$Π i B = [f (1 + k d) + t (1 + k b)] / 2 - β (1 + k b) (1 + k d) [2 f + α (1 + k b)] / (6 f)$
消费者效用	$U b i B = (4 v b - 5 t) / 8 + [4 f β + 3 f α + 2 α β (1 + k b)] (1 + k d) / (12 f)$
开发者效用	$U d i B = (4 v d - 5 f) / 8 + β (1 + k b) / 4$

表3

图2

图3

图4

图5

图6

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