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中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (11): 186-198.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0675cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0675

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对需求变化的过度预期与静/动态定价契约选择

经有国, 张艳(), 刘震, 庞顺超, 秦开大   

  1. 昆明理工大学管理与经济学院,云南 昆明 650500
  • 收稿日期:2023-04-25 修回日期:2026-01-12 出版日期:2026-11-25 发布日期:2026-11-10
  • 通讯作者: 张艳 E-mail:zy1209778061@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72261022);国家自然科学基金项目(72261023);昆明理工大学哲学社会科学科研创新团队项目(CXTD2023003);昆明理工大学哲学社会科学实验室“数智管理与新型工业化”项目(KGZSSYS2025001);云南省朱庆华专家工作站项目(202305AF150028);云南省基础研究计划项目昆明理工大学“双一流”创建联合专项(202401BE070001-059)

Over-prediction of Demand Change and Choice between Static or Dynamic Pricing Contracts

Youguo Jing, Yan Zhang(), Zhen Liu, Shunchao Pang, Kaida Qin   

  1. Faculty of Management and Economics,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming 650500,China
  • Received:2023-04-25 Revised:2026-01-12 Online:2026-11-25 Published:2026-11-10
  • Contact: Yan Zhang E-mail:zy1209778061@163.com

摘要:

本文考虑一个两周期非平稳需求的供应链,其第二周期的潜在市场需求会出现一定的升降变化,一方面,制造商对该需求变化存在过度(非理性)预期;另一方面,零售商可通过持有战略库存来影响制造商的定价行为。分别建立理性预期和过度预期情形下基于静/动态定价契约的不同动态博弈模型,分析需求升降幅度及过度预期放大系数(制造商非理性程度)对定价决策及契约偏好的影响。研究发现,无论需求如何变化以及制造商是否存在非理性预期行为,零售商始终偏好动态定价契约。当需求上升时,理性或非理性的制造商均偏好动态定价契约,制造商和零售商对动态定价契约的偏好程度与需求上升幅度正相关;当需求下降幅度较小时,理性、轻度或重度不理性的制造商均偏好动态定价契约,而中度不理性的制造商偏好静态定价契约;当需求下降幅度较大时,理性或中度不理性的制造商偏好静态定价契约,而轻度或重度不理性的制造商偏好动态定价契约。在需求上升时,非理性程度的增加会加剧损害制造商和零售商的利益;在需求下降时,非理性程度的增加仍然会加剧损害制造商利益,但很可能会使零售商和供应链整体加速获益。

关键词: 需求变化, 过度预期, 战略库存, 动态定价, 批发价格契约

Abstract:

In multi-period supply chains, upstream manufacturers may overpredict future demand changes, a behavioral bias that can intensify the bullwhip effect, while downstream retailers may strategically adjust inventory to influence future pricing. Yet their combined effects under demand uncertainty, especially regarding static versus dynamic pricing contracts, remain underexamined. This study analyzes a two-period supply chain with non-stationary demand, one manufacturer, and one retailer. First-period market size is normalized to one; second-period market size changes and may be overpredicted by the manufacturer. Using a dynamic game-theoretic framework, four two-period Stackelberg models are developed and solved by backward induction, differing in manufacturer expectation formation (rational expectations or overprediction) and contract type (static or dynamic pricing). Findings show the retailer always prefers dynamic pricing. The manufacturer’s preference depends on demand conditions and expectation bias: under demand increases, both rational and overpredicting manufacturers prefer dynamic pricing; under slight decreases, rational manufacturers and those with mild or severe overprediction favor dynamic pricing, while moderate overprediction favors static pricing; under substantial decreases, rational and moderately overpredicting manufacturers prefer static pricing, while mildly and severely overpredicting manufacturers prefer dynamic pricing. Manufacturer overprediction always reduces its own profit, but its effects on the retailer and total supply chain are asymmetric, negative under demand increases, often beneficial under demand decreases. This study contributes by integrating non-stationary demand and manufacturer overprediction into one analytical framework, clarifying interactions among the Strategic Inventory Effect, Demand Change Effect, and Overprediction Effect, and offering practical insights for pricing contract selection under demand volatility and behavioral bias.

Key words: demand change, over-prediction, strategic inventory, dynamic pricing, wholesale price contract

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