“双积分”能否完全替代“补贴”？——基于燃油和新能源汽车的产量权衡与燃油降耗策略的分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0051

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

通过对燃油和新能源汽车的需求以及汽车燃油降耗和汽车商誉进行动态分析，建立一个可同时生产和销售燃油和新能源汽车供应链的微分博弈模型。基于此，分析仅进行新能源汽车购置补贴、仅进行汽车双积分以及进行补贴加双积分三种不同政策对汽车燃油降耗和两类汽车产量的影响。研究结论表明：只要在双积分政策中设置一个较高的新能源汽车比例，双积分政策的实施可以促进燃油汽车的降耗投资；新能源汽车购置补贴政策的退出虽然不会降低燃油汽车的需求量，也不会对燃油汽车的降耗产生影响，但是会在一定程度上影响新能源汽车的需求量。只要适当地调整双积分政策，例如确定合适的新能源汽车比例要求和每台新能源汽车的积分值，就可以促进新能源汽车的需求上升，以弥补补贴政策完全退出的影响，而且这些政策的调整还可以促进燃油汽车降耗；实施双积分加补贴政策后，补贴政策的退出使制造商、零售商和整个供应链的利润可能下降，也有可能上升，但是其利润的变化不大，因为数值分析结果显示，供应链各方及整体利润水平在两种政策下的差异率仅在0.28%~1.92%的区间内变动。研究成果对新能源汽车购置补贴政策的完全退出提供了理论依据。

关键词: 节能降耗, 双积分政策, 补贴政策, 微分博弈, 汽车行业

Abstract:

China’s new-energy-vehicle purchase subsidy policy and double credit policy for vehicles have both played a positive role in the low-carbon development of the automotive industry. However， problems such as the increased financial burden of the subsidy policy have made the complete withdrawal of the policy come to the forefront. At the same time， there is a common concern in politics and academia that the withdrawal of the policy will not be conducive to the low-carbon development of the automobile industry. To this end， the dynamics of the demand for fuel and new energy vehicles and the reduction of fuel consumption and goodwill of automobiles is analyzed. It establishes a differential game model for the supply chain that mixes the production of fuel and new energy vehicles. Based on this， it analyzes the impact of three different policies： subsidies for the purchase of new energy vehicles only， double credit for automobiles only， and subsidies plus double credit on the fuel consumption reduction of cars and the production of the two types of automobiles. It is concluded that as long as a higher proportion of new energy vehicles is required in the double credit policy， the implementation of the double credit policy can promote fuel consumption reduction investment； the withdrawal of the new energy vehicle purchase subsidy will not reduce the demand for fuel vehicles， nor will it have an impact on fuel vehicle consumption reduction. Still， it will affect the market demand for new energy vehicles. However， as long as the mechanism of the dual credit policy is appropriately adjusted， such as the proportion requirement of new energy vehicles and the point value of each new energy vehicle， the demand for new energy vehicles can be promoted to make up for the impact of the complete withdrawal of subsidy policies， and the adjustment of these policies can also promote the fuel consumption reduction of fuel vehicles； After the implementation of the double credit plus subsidy policy， the withdrawal of the subsidy policy so that the manufacturer， the retailer， and the entire profits of the supply chain may go down as well as up， but the change in their earnings is not significant， as the analysis of several numerical examples shows that the difference in the profit levels of all parties in the supply chain and the overall profit level under the two policies is only in the range of 0.28% to 1.92%. The research results provide a theoretical basis for the complete withdrawal of the new-energy-vehicle purchase subsidy policy.

Key words: energy saving and consumption reduction, double credit policy, subsidy policy, differential game, automotive industry

中图分类号:

F062.2

易永锡,张梦,曹裕, 等. “双积分”能否完全替代“补贴”？——基于燃油和新能源汽车的产量权衡与燃油降耗策略的分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(1): 303-314.

Yongxi Yi,Meng Zhang,Yu Cao, et al. Can "Double Points" Completely Replace "Subsidies"? Based on the Analysis of Output Trade-off of Fuel and New Energy Vehicles and Fuel Consumption Reduction Strategy[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(1): 303-314.

图/表 5

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