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主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
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中国管理科学 ›› 2025, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (12): 87-99.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.0136cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.0136

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考虑数据优势的在线平台数据投资和定价决策

席轩, 张玉林()   

  1. 东南大学经济管理学院,江苏 南京 211189
  • 收稿日期:2024-01-23 修回日期:2024-03-24 出版日期:2025-12-25 发布日期:2025-12-25
  • 通讯作者: 张玉林 E-mail:zhangyl@seu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金重大项目(21&ZD118);国家自然科学基金面上项目(72071040);江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划项目(KYCX22_0252);中国国家留学基金管理委员会项目(202206090123)

Data Investment and Pricing Decisions for Online Platforms Considering Data Advantage

Xuan Xi, Yulin Zhang()   

  1. School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China
  • Received:2024-01-23 Revised:2024-03-24 Online:2025-12-25 Published:2025-12-25
  • Contact: Yulin Zhang E-mail:zhangyl@seu.edu.cn

摘要:

随着数据资源成为驱动平台经济高质量发展的重要原动力,许多在线平台围绕着数据资源的竞争愈发激烈。本文考虑在线平台的数据优势,用两阶段博弈模型考察平台企业在数据投资策略和双边用户定价上的收益权衡,讨论了3种情形:垄断环境、广告商多归属的差异化竞争环境以及广告商单归属的差异化竞争环境。研究得出,无论是垄断平台还是竞争平台环境,数据投资的市场吸引力取决于平台对两边用户产生的边际效应与数据流通价值之间的权衡。在数据有差异的竞争环境,数据优势并不总能激励平台提高数据投资水平以及对用户的定价,数据投资策略还受到平台独占数据市场能力的影响。随着数据投资对消费者效用的负面效应逐渐向正面转变,投资策略将经历均不投资、仅数据劣势平台投资、均投资和仅数据优势平台投资4个阶段的演化。相比于广告商多归属,广告商单归属时,平台的数据投资水平降低而定价会提高;广告商的单归属行为还会加剧平台间对消费者和数据的双重竞争,进一步降低投资的市场吸引力而提高平台独占数据市场的能力。

关键词: 双边市场, 数据优势, 在线平台, 数据投资, 定价

Abstract:

As data emerges as a pivotal driver of the robust growth of the platform economy, the competition for data resources among many online platforms becomes more and more intense. Focusing on the impact of data dominance on online platforms, a two-stage game model is employed to explore the data investment and user pricing decisions of competing platforms. Three scenarios are considered: monopoly, differentiated competition with multi-homing advertisers and differentiated competition with single-homing advertisers. The results show that the market attractiveness of data investment always depends on the tradeoff between the marginal effect of data investment on users and the data trading value in all scenarios. However, in competitive environments where data differentiation exists, data advantage does not always incentivize the platform to increase the level of data investment or pricing decisions. Instead, data investment strategies are shaped by the platform's capacity to monopolize the data market. With the increasing effect of data investment on consumers' utility, the data investment strategy of competing platforms will undergo four stages of evolution: from “no investment” to “platform investment with data disadvantage,” onward to “both investments”, and eventually culminating in “platform investment with data advantage”. When compared to the scenario involving multi-homing advertisers, the single-homing advertisers setup yields a diminished level of data investment alongside elevated prices. More importantly, the single-homing behavior of advertisers amplifies the platform's dual competition encompassing both user engagement and data, thereby dampening the attractiveness of investment while simultaneously boosting the platform's potential to monopolize the data market.

Key words: two-sided markets, data advantage, online platform, data investment, pricing

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