碳交易背景下考虑消费者动态绿色感知的碳减排决策研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0867

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

随着“双碳”目标的不断推进，消费者越来越重视产品的绿色质量，然而，消费者对绿色质量的感知会随着企业低碳行为以及时间的演变而动态变化。本文在碳交易背景下构建了由政府、制造商、零售商组成的供应链，将消费者绿色感知与碳减排水平的动态过程考虑进模型中，运用微分博弈方法，探讨了不同补贴模式下，消费者绿色偏好、碳交易价格、环境成本对供应链成员碳减排决策的影响，并利用数值算例分析了碳交易价格、生产排放系数对企业利润、社会福利以及碳排放量的影响。研究发现：消费者补贴对供应链成员决策的影响要高于制造商补贴；相较于制造商补贴，政府采取消费者补贴可以更好地提高供应链成员对环境成本的关注积极性。从长期来看，消费者补贴模式下的社会福利稳态值高于制造商补贴，但在产品初期阶段，消费者补贴模式下的社会福利较低，甚至会低于无补贴模式；当碳交易价格与消费者绿色偏好同时较高时，消费者补贴模式下的最优补贴率更高。最后，从企业和政府角度分别给出了建议。

关键词: 碳配额交易, 绿色感知, 碳减排, 政府补贴, 微分博弈

Abstract:

The regulation and mitigation of carbon emissions have become critical priorities worldwide. Consequently， many national governments have sequentially introduced diverse emission reduction policies， while the carbon trading market has been demonstrated as an efficacious market-based mechanism， serving as a crucial tool for mitigating carbon emissions. Furthermore， consumers' green consciousness is progressively intensifying， with an increasing number of consumers expressing concerns about the carbon footprint of products. Existing literature has examined factors influencing emission reduction and the impact of consumer green consciousness on such reduction efforts. However， there is limited consideration given to the dynamic change in consumers’ green perception. Consumers’ green perception， similar to carbon reduction， is a long-term dynamic process influenced by factors such as low-carbon policies and technological innovation. Therefore， considering the cap-and-trade and taking dynamic green perception and dynamic carbon reduction into account simultaneously， the impact of different government subsidy policies （consumer subsidy under the TC model and manufacturer subsidy under the TM model） on optimal decision-making in the supply chain is investigated. Furthermore， leveraging carbon emission data from energy-efficient air conditioners by Midea， along with cost data for Carbon Capture， Utilization， and Storage （CCUS）， and current carbon price from the cap-and-trade， a numerical analysis is conducted to examine the impacts of carbon trading prices and production emission coefficients on enterprise profits， societal welfare， and carbon emissions. It is found that：（1） Compared to the TM model， the proactive attention of supply chain members to environmental costs has been effectively enhanced under the TC model. （2） The steady-state value of societal welfare under the TC model surpasses that under the TM model from the long-term perspective. However， during the initial stages of product introduction， the societal welfare is lower under the TC model， even lower than that under the no-subsidy model. （3） When both the carbon trading price and consumer green preferences are relatively high， the optimal subsidy rate under the TC model is higher.

Key words: cap-and-trade, dynamic green perception, emission reduction, government subsidy, differential game

中图分类号:

F274

张丹露,李峰,梁樑, 等. 碳交易背景下考虑消费者动态绿色感知的碳减排决策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2025, 33(10): 269-281.

Danlu Zhang,Feng Li,Liang Liang, et al. Carbon Emission Reduction Decision Considering Dynamic Consumer Green Perception under the Cap-and-trade Policy[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(10): 269-281.

图/表 9

图1

表1

参数含义"

参数	含义	参数	含义
$α$	碳减排感知系数	$ς$	碳交易价格
$r n$	低碳宣传感知系数	$A$	政府发放的碳配额量
$r m$	减排量系数	$v$	环境成本系数
$δ$	减排量衰减率	$e (t)$	污染物排放总量
$λ$	绿色感知衰减率	$R (t)$	消费者在 $t$ 时刻的绿色感知
$a$	潜在规模	$τ (t)$	产品在 $t$ 时刻的减排量
$φ$	价格敏感系数	$L (t)$	在 $t$ 时刻的环境成本
$μ$	消费者对的绿色偏好	$E m (t)$	制造商在 $t$ 时刻的碳减排努力水平
$β m$	制造商碳减排努力成本系数	$E n (t)$	零售商在 $t$ 时刻的低碳宣传水平
$β n$	零售商低碳减排宣传成本系数	$p (t)$	产品在 $t$ 时刻的零售价
$z$	生产排放系数	$w (t)$	产品在 $t$ 时刻的批发价

表1

表2

最优价格以及低碳宣传努力水平决策对比"

$μ$	$v$	$ς$	比较结果
$0 < μ < 1 / 4$	$v 1 < v < v ¯$	$0 < ς < ς 1$	$p T N = p T M > p T C$ $w T N = w T M > w T C$ $E n T N = E n T M > E n T C$
$1 / 4 < μ < 1$	$v 2 < v < v ¯$	$ς 1 < ς < ς ¯$
$0 < μ < 1 / 4$	$0 < v < v 1$	$0 < ς < ς ¯$	$p T C > p T M = p T N$ $w T C > w T M = w T N$ $E n T C > E n T N = E n T M$
$0 < μ < 1 / 4$	$v 1 < v < v ¯$	$ς 1 < ς < ς ¯$
$1 / 4 < μ < 1$	$0 < v < v 2$	$0 < ς < ς ¯$
$1 / 4 < μ < 1$	$v 2 < v < v ¯$	$0 < ς < ς 1$

表2

表3

碳减排努力、绿色感知稳态值以及碳减排稳态值对比"

$μ$	$v$	$ς$	对比结果
$0 < μ < 14$	$0 < v < v 3$	$0 < ς < ς ¯$	$E m T C > E m T M > E m T N$ $r ∞ T C > r ∞ T M > r ∞ T N$ $τ ∞ T C > τ ∞ T M > τ ∞ T N$
	$v 3 < v < v 1$	$ς 3 < ς < ς ¯$
	$v 1 < v < v ¯$	$ς 3 < ς < ς ¯$
$14 < μ < 34$	$0 < v < v 3$	$0 < ς < ς ¯$
$14 < μ < 34$	$v 3 < v < v 2$	$ς 3 < ς < ς ¯$
$34 < μ < 1$	$0 < v < v 2$	$0 < ς < ς ¯$
$34 < μ < 1$	$v 2 < v < v 3$	$0 < ς < ς 3$
$0 < μ < 14$	$v 3 < v < v 1$	$0 < ς < ς 3$	$E m T C > E m T N > E m T M$ $r ∞ T C > r ∞ T N > r ∞ T M$ $τ ∞ T C > τ ∞ T N > τ ∞ T M$
$0 < μ < 14$	$v 1 < v < v ¯$	$ς 1 < ς < ς 3$
$14 < μ < 34$	$v 3 < v < v 2$	$0 < ς < ς 3$
$14 < μ < 34$	$v 2 < v < v ¯$	$0 < ς < ς 1$
$34 < μ < 1$	$v 2 < v < v 3$	$ς 3 < ς < ς 1$
$34 < μ < 1$	$v 3 < v < v ¯$	$0 < ς < ς 1$
$0 < μ < 14$	$v 1 < v < v ¯$	$0 < ς < ς 1$	$E m T N > E m T C > E m T M$ $r ∞ T N > r ∞ T C > r ∞ T M$ $τ ∞ T N > τ ∞ T C > τ ∞ T M$
$14 < μ < 34$	$v 2 < v < v ¯$	$ς 1 < ς < ς ¯$
$34 < μ < 1$	$v 2 < v < v 3$	$ς 1 < ς < ς ¯$
$34 < μ < 1$	$v 3 < v < v ¯$	$ς 1 < ς < ς ¯$

表3

图2

图3

图4

图5

图6

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