关键词: 低碳供应链, 碳审计, 合规管理, ENGO, 企业社会责任

Abstract: In practice, non-compliant carbon reduction behaviors—such as carbon greenwashing and excessive carbon emissions—are frequently observed, severely hindering the green and low-carbon development of supply chains and undermining the achievement of China's dual-carbon target. The carbon footprint in supply chains primarily originates from suppliers, and once suppliers' non-compliance in carbon reduction is exposed, it can damage the reputational capital of downstream retailers. Therefore, core downstream enterprises in the supply chain are motivated and willing to regulate suppliers' non-compliant carbon reduction behaviors through carbon audits. However, due to limitations in auditing capabilities and costs on the part of retailers, as well as deliberate evasion by suppliers, the effectiveness of internal supply chain audits is often compromised. This study thus considers leveraging the professional auditing expertise of external supply chain actors, specifically Environmental Non-Governmental Organization (ENGO), to explore the retailer's optimal carbon audit strategy: should the retailer choose to collaborate with ENGO for joint audits, or conduct independent audits of suppliers? Furthermore, can joint audits effectively enhance suppliers' compliance with carbon reduction regulations? To answer the above questions, a game-theoretic model involving an Environmental Non-Governmental Organization (ENGO), a supplier, and a retailer is developed to compare and analyze the optimal decisions and profits under independent and joint audit strategies. The results show that, first, joint audits between retailers and ENGO do not always lead to improved supplier compliance in carbon reduction. When the retailer has a low capacity to absorb auditing techniques, collaboration may actually reduce compliance levels and hinder environmental benefits. Second, when the retailer has strong auditing absorptive capacity, joint audits can achieve cost reduction and efficiency gains—enhancing supplier compliance while also lowering auditing costs. Finally, within a certain range of absorptive capacity, the joint audit strategy can balance both economic and environmental performance, fully demonstrating its value. It not only boosts profits for both retailers and suppliers but also improves compliance in carbon reduction, thus achieving mutual benefits for the retailer, supplier, and ENGO. In summary, by comparing independent and joint audit strategies, this study provides insights into whether core enterprises in supply chains should engage in audit collaboration to regulate suppliers' non-compliant carbon reduction behaviors, thereby supporting the high-quality development of low-carbon supply chains.

Key words: low-carbon supply chain, carbon audit, compliance management, ENGO, corporate social responsibility